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Does Rigorously Enforcing Arbitration Agreements
Promote “Autonomy”?
HIRO N. ARAGAKI*
In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has helped transform arbitration law into
a radical private-ordering regime in which freedom of contract has come to eclipse
public regulation. Arbitration jurisprudence justifies this transformation in part on
a profound and longstanding commitment to the ideal of individual autonomy,
understood as the freedom—lacking in litigation—to select a disputing process best
suited to one’s needs.
In this Article, I question the cogency of this justification. I argue, first, that
autonomy has had different and sometimes conflicting meanings even within
arbitration jurisprudence. Second, depending on the meaning one ascribes to
autonomy, it is at best uncertain whether a commitment to it requires enforcing
arbitration agreements with minimal regulation by the state. Ironically, the
libertarian interpretation of autonomy that lies at the heart of the Court’s recent
arbitration decisions turns out to be the least adept at explaining why arbitration
agreements should be “‘rigorously enforce[d]’ . . . according to their terms.” To the
extent we wish to continue viewing enforcement as important for the value of
autonomy in arbitration, therefore, it appears we must rethink what autonomy means
in this context and whether in certain circumstances autonomy may be best promoted
by refusing to enforce arbitration agreements.
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INTRODUCTION
In the early twenty-first century, it is no exaggeration to declare that freedom of
contract is now “at the very core of how the law regulates arbitration.”1 By freedom

† Copyright © 2016 Hiro N. Aragaki.
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I thank Michael
Helfand, Eric Miller, Alexandra Natapoff, Jennifer Reynolds, and participants at the 2015
Southern California Junior Faculty Workshop for insightful feedback.
1. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of
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of contract, I mean the enforcement of arbitration agreements with minimal
regulation by the state—what the U.S. Supreme Court has described as “‘rigorously
enforc[ing]’ arbitration agreements according to their terms.”2
The triumph of freedom of contract in the arbitration area is evident in a number
of different ways. Although arbitration was once largely limited to contractual
claims,3 in the modern era agreements to arbitrate are enforceable even as to claims
under Title VII and other federal statutes designed to further important public
interests.4 It matters little whether the terms of the agreement make it too costly or
burdensome as a practical matter to bring such causes of action in the arbitral forum.
For as the Court recently explained, the law’s “command to enforce arbitration
agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of . . . claims.”5
Likewise, under the doctrine of Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preemption,
private agreements to arbitrate are now effectively immunized from any state
legislation or public policy.6 Thus, arbitrators may award punitive damages even if
state law reserves such quasi-public remedies exclusively to judicial processes.7 State
legislatures are powerless to promote informed assent to so-called mandatory
arbitration clauses—for example, by requiring such clauses to be printed in
underlined capital letters on the face of an adhesion contract.8 The net effect is that
arbitration agreements are not just enforced but rigorously enforced to a degree

Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1189, 1193 (2003) [hereinafter
Carbonneau, Contract Freedom] (criticizing this view); see also Thomas E. Carbonneau, At
the Crossroads of Legitimacy and Arbitral Autonomy, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 213, 258 (2005)
[hereinafter Carbonneau, Crossroads] (describing freedom of contract as an “absolute value”
in arbitration); J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124
YALE L.J. 3052, 3068 (2015) (describing the Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence as a
“pure freedom of contract” paradigm (emphasis in original)); Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in
Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 486 (1997) (“[T]he arbitration process is in fact all
about . . . private ordering and self-determination.”).
2. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (quoting Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
3. See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646
Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 25 (1924) (statement of
Alexander Rose, Arbitration Society of America).
4. See Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1256–57
(2011).
5. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2312 n.5.
6. In effect, such agreements are enforced “notwithstanding any state substantive or
procedural policies to the contrary.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
7. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57, 61 n.7 (1995); cf.
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 21(a) & cmt. 1 (2000), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org
/shared/docs/arbitration/arbitration_final_00.pdf [https://perma.cc/GN2W-VBV7] (permitting
punitive damages in arbitration); NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., AM.
ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES princ. 14
& cmt. (1998), available at https://adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_005014 [https://perma.cc
/KK8B-PTH9] (permitting punitive damages in consumer arbitration).
8. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
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unknown in other contracting contexts. This has led many commentators to claim
that arbitration agreements are a type of “super contract.”9
What explains the law’s embrace of a radical private-ordering regime in the
arbitration area? To realists, it is a function of the Court’s conservative, pro-business
leanings.10 Positivists, on the other hand, will explain it as flowing inexorably from
the plain language of the FAA—language that seems practically to dictate freedom
of contract by declaring that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable” subject only to common-law contract defenses.11 Theorists will give
still a third answer: enforcing arbitration agreements strictly according to their terms
is a natural implication of the strong commitment in both arbitration law and practice
to the ideal of personal autonomy. It is this last explanation that I propose to
interrogate in this Article.
Autonomy has for some time occupied a central place in arbitration jurisprudence
and in the jurisprudence of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) more generally.12
Unlike the one-size-fits-all approach of litigation, arbitration’s hallmark has been the
wide scope of choice that it provides for parties to design a disputing procedure best
suited to their needs and circumstances.13 From the Court of Arbitration for Sport14
to the Writers Guild arbitration procedure,15 arbitration has given parties the freedom
to develop a stunning diversity of procedures designed to meet the unique challenges
of a variety of different disputing contexts. This has led courts and commentators to
claim that party autonomy is not just one among many distinctive values in
arbitration; it is “the highest priority in the pantheon of arbitration values.”16 I refer
to this as the “autonomy thesis.”

9. See infra notes 120–23 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions:
Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 74, 96 (2011); Andrew Cohen, No Class: The Supreme Court’s Arbitration
Ruling, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive
/2011/04/no-class-the-supreme-courts-arbitration-ruling/237967/ [https://perma.cc/GX8K-APTS].
11. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added) (making arbitration clauses enforceable except
on “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” (emphasis
added)); see Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1246–47 (noting that the savings clause has been
construed as including only common-law contract defenses).
12. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of
Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 65 (1999) (“Party autonomy is a significant feature of all
ADR, and constitutes an especially critical underpinning to arbitration theory and practice.”).
13. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1,
50–51.
14. See generally Richard H. McLaren, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: An
Independent Arena for the World’s Sports Disputes, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 379 (2001).
15. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc., 277 Cal. Rptr. 450 (Ct. App.
1991); WRITERS GUILD OF AM., W., THE LEGAL ARBITRATION PROCESS, available at
http://www.wga.org/uploadedfiles/if_you_are_a_member/arbitration_pamphlet.pdf [https://perma.cc
/ZQU7-Q4NC].
16. Edward Brunet, The Core Values of Arbitration, in EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E.
SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 3, 5 (2006); see also id. at 4 (describing party autonomy as “the
fundamental value of arbitration”).
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At a superficial level the autonomy thesis seems to help explain why the Court
views the rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements as the “preeminent” or
“primary” purpose of federal arbitration law.17 For by faithfully enforcing arbitration
agreements, the state appears to do little more than create space for the parties freely
to pursue their own ideas of the “good” of dispute resolution.18 By contrast,
regulating such agreements appears to restrict autonomy because it risks imposing
external values about adjudication on the parties—values that they did not
necessarily freely choose.19
In this Article, I question whether the autonomy thesis points unproblematically
in the direction of enforcing arbitration agreements with minimal regulation by the
state. I argue that autonomy can mean many different things and that, depending on
the conception of autonomy to which one subscribes, autonomy might require not
freedom of contract but rather freedom from contract. Although philosophers have
for a long time sought to understand the multiple and often conflicting ways of
understanding autonomy, courts and commentators writing in the arbitration area
have paid comparatively little attention to these nuances. As a result, they have been
led to overestimate the persuasiveness of the autonomy thesis in justifying the
rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I seek to better understand the nature
of the autonomy thesis—in particular, whether it is a claim primarily about negative
or positive liberty. Some commentators cleave to the staunchly libertarian view that
autonomy is little more than the absence of external constraints on choice, while
others betray a much more robust conception of autonomy as a type of
self-governance. But the diversity of views among commentators has not (for the
most part) been reflected in the Court’s modern arbitration jurisprudence. At the heart
of that jurisprudence, I argue, is a conception of autonomy qua negative liberty.
In Part II, I evaluate the extent to which a commitment to the autonomy thesis (in
either its negative or positive variants) requires rigorously enforcing arbitration
agreements. The argument in favor of rigorous enforcement entails two things: (i) an
affirmative argument for enforcement and (ii) an argument against the regulation of
that enforcement by the state. I conclude that interpreting autonomy in negative
liberty terms presents a weak justification for either (i) or (ii). Although interpreting
autonomy in positive terms presents a somewhat stronger affirmative argument for
why arbitration agreements should be enforced, it does not necessarily imply
minimal regulation by the state. Positive liberty is moreover in tension with the
strong negative liberty orientation of arbitration law. Forging a more persuasive and
balanced link between autonomy and enforcement along positive liberty lines would

17. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010); Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985); accord Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995) (“[T]he basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to
overcome courts’ refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate.”).
18. As Thomas Stipanowich put it, “[a]rbitration law promotes the autonomy of parties
by enforcing their agreements to arbitrate.” Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration
Penumbra: Arbitration Law and the Rapidly Changing Landscape of Dispute Resolution, 8
NEV. L.J. 427, 430 (2007).
19. See George A. Bermann, Ascertaining the Parties’ Intentions in Arbitral Design, 113
PENN ST. L. REV. 1013, 1028 (2008).
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therefore require relinquishing important features of the Court’s modern arbitration
jurisprudence.
I. MAKING SENSE OF THE AUTONOMY THESIS
Many important values animate the law and practice of arbitration. Autonomy—broadly
construed as the freedom to design a process tailored to the parties’ needs—is
certainly one such value. So is procedural simplicity or efficiency,20 which is
believed to reduce the time and cost of adjudication and to produce other systemic
benefits such as clearing congested court dockets.21 Still another is the preservation
of business relationships and discouraging unnecessary adversarialism.22 And as I
have elsewhere argued, access to justice and better procedure were also expressed
reasons to prefer arbitration over litigation around the time the FAA was enacted.23
What I shall call the “autonomy thesis” is the now well-entrenched claim that
autonomy is (or should be) the primary value that animates arbitration law and
policy.24 Thus, Thomas Stipanowich argues that “the central and primary value of
arbitration is not speed, or economy, or privacy, or neutral expertise, but rather the
ability of users to make key process choices to suit their particular needs.”25 Stephen
Ware likewise claims that because “‘autonomy . . . [i]s the value that transcends these

20. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011)
(observing that “the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost
and increasing the speed of dispute resolution”); Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684–86 (observing
that, by increasing costs and decreasing efficiency and speed, class arbitration “changes the
nature of arbitration”); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008)
(describing “arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway”).
21. Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown, Helena Lee & David Hubbert,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1363 (“Arbitration is a process disputants have used for years in an
effort to circumvent the court system’s costly delays and congested dockets.” (footnote
omitted)); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 642 (1996) (linking the Court’s
aggressively pro-arbitration jurisprudence beginning in the 1980s with a “growing concern
that dockets were overloaded”).
22. See, e.g., Advantages Ascribed to Arbitration, 9 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 73, 74
(1925) (“Arbitration [c]onserves [f]riendly [r]elations”); Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a
Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982); Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why
Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses? 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433,
451–52 (2010).
23. See Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1939 (2014).
24. See, e.g., UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT prefatory note (2000) (“[A]utonomy of the
parties . . . should be given primary consideration . . . .”); Gary Born & Claudio Salas, The
United States Supreme Court and Class Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL.
21, 39 (“[A]rbitration is aimed first and foremost at ensuring the parties’ procedural
autonomy.”); Edward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach
to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1069 (1987) (theorizing that “the
legitimacy of arbitral proceedings flows directly from a vision of private autonomy as the
conceptual basis of contract law”).
25. Stipanowich, supra note 13, at 51.
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other values,’” it is “arbitration’s essential virtue.”26 So, too, Edward Brunet declares
that “party autonomy [is] the highest priority in the pantheon of arbitration values.”27
Consistent with these claims, Alan Rau contends that “arbitration should be
understood through the lenses of contract rather than of adjudication” and that with
respect to arbitration law, “the only serious inquiry ought to be one into the
understanding and underlying assumptions of the contracting parties.”28
But despite what may be a near “universal[]”29 acceptance of the significance of
autonomy to arbitration law and policy, it is an underappreciated fact that there is
little agreement about what exactly autonomy in this context means. Many
contemporary debates in arbitration can be understood as debates not over the
relative importance of autonomy vis-à-vis other values but over the meaning of
autonomy itself. Until we are clear about that meaning, therefore, it will be
impossible to assess the claim that the autonomy thesis favors the rigorous
enforcement of arbitration agreements. In this Part, I attempt to bring this clarity.
A. Negative and Positive Liberty
A distinction is often drawn in liberal political theory between “negative” and
“positive” liberty.30 Although the distinction has been subject to extensive
criticism,31 for my purposes it provides a useful analytic framework through which
to understand the autonomy thesis.
From a negative liberty standpoint, freedom is little more than the absence of
external restraint or coercion by the state or by private actors.32 As Isaiah Berlin put
it, “I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men
interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this [negative] sense is simply the area
within which a man can act unobstructed by others.”33 Negative liberty has often
been described as an “opportunity concept” because it conceives of freedom merely
in terms of how many doors are open rather than slammed shut.34 The inherent appeal

26. Stephen J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. &
MEDIATION 56, 92 (2014) (quoting Stephen Ware, Comments of Professor Stephen Ware, in
BRUNET ET AL., supra note 16, at 327, 339).
27. Brunet, supra note 16, at 5.
28. Rau, supra note 1, at 487.
29. S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?
Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 226
(2012) (observing that “party autonomy . . . is universally agreed to be a fundamental principle
of arbitration”).
30. The most well-known statement of this distinction is Isaiah Berlin’s. See ISAIAH
BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969).
31. See generally K ATRIN F LIKSCHUH , F REEDOM : C ONTEMPORARY L IBERAL
PERSPECTIVES (2007).
32. See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 16–17 (1960) (defining liberty
as the absence of both “restraint,” in the sense of being prevented from taking certain actions,
and “constraint,” in the sense of being forced to take certain actions).
33. BERLIN, supra note 30, at 122.
34. 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?, in PHILOSOPHY & THE
HUMAN SCIENCES 211, 213–14 (1985). Berlin, in particular, conceived of negative liberty
using the metaphor of open doors. BERLIN, supra note 30, at xxxix (describing negative liberty
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of this conception is that it is value neutral: it imports no substantive judgments about
how easy or difficult it is to walk through any given door—indeed, about which open
doors are worth walking through to begin with—and thus about what real freedom
looks like.35 To borrow Lea Brilmayer’s example, from a negative liberty standpoint
the “life choices of the beer-swilling, pornography-reading jet-ski cowboy” are no
less free—or deserving of freedom—than those of “the bookish intellectual.”36
Freedom consists rather in the individual’s essential separateness from others and
from the state.37
Classical utilitarianism, by contrast, paid little respect to this separateness. It had
few qualms about sacrificing the freedom of some to improve the welfare of the many
through, for instance, redistributive measures.38 But from a liberal perspective that
places a premium on the sanctity of the individual, this type of intervention “fails to
take seriously the distinction between persons.”39 True freedom requires instead that
individuals be treated as ends in themselves, not as mere means toward the
achievement of other public or private objectives.40 This, in turn, entails that they
possess rights against intrusions on their freedom both by others and by the state.41
It explains why rights-based theories tend to find their origin in theories of negative
liberty.
On the negative liberty view, therefore, freedom is inversely related to
government regulation. States do not respect individual freedom through social
assistance, measures designed to promote human flourishing, or other forms of what
Sir William Vernon-Harcourt described as “grandmotherly government.”42 They do
so instead by staying out of everyone’s business. It is for this reason that negative
liberty theories typically betray a deep skepticism of centralized decision making,
paternalism, and state intervention in free markets.43 Restrictions on freedom can

as dependent, inter alia, on “how many doors are open” and “how open they are”).
35. HAYEK, supra note 32, at 18 (“[T]o be free may mean freedom to starve, to make
costly mistakes, or to run mortal risks.”).
36. Lea Brilmayer, Lonely Libertarian: One Man’s View of Antidiscrimination Law, 31
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 123 (1994).
37. See H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 829–34 (1979)
(describing rights-based liberal and libertarian theories as emphasizing the moral
“separateness” of individuals).
38. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, The Philosophy of Economic Science, in 1 W. STARK,
JEREMY BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS 81, 115–16 (1952).
39. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 187 (1971).
40. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 30, 48–50 (1974).
41. This is the move Robert Nozick makes in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Nozick argues
that rights as “[s]ide constraints upon action reflect the underlying Kantian principle that
individuals are ends and not merely means; they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving
of other ends without their consent. Individuals are inviolable.” NOZICK, supra note 40, at 31.
42. See T.H. Green, Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract, in THE LIBERTY
READER 21, 25 (David Miller ed., 2006).
43. For example, Mill famously took the view that the state may not compel
individuals to
do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him
happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.
These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or
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only be justified on narrow and supposedly value-neutral terms such as preventing
harm to, or securing a like freedom for, others.44
If negative liberty is more of an “opportunity concept,” positive liberty is
better understood as an “exercise concept”: it asks not just how many doors are
open, but whether their being open contributes in any meaningful sense to one’s
freedom—especially if one lacks the resources, wherewithal, or maturity to walk
through any of them.45 A bird in the wild whose wings have been clipped has the
opportunity to fly in the sense that nobody is preventing it from doing so, such as by
confining it to a cage; from a negative liberty standpoint it is therefore perfectly free.
But as Bishop Bramhall once put it, this is at best a “brutish liberty”46 because the
physical handicap renders the bird unable to exercise this freedom in any real or
meaningful way. Freedom in the positive sense is therefore often described as a
freedom “to”—what John Dewey referred to as an “effective power to do specific
things.”47 To positive liberty theorists, the bare freedom “from” constraint is an
impoverished conception of freedom. Although freedom from external constraint
may be a necessary ingredient of freedom insofar as a caged bird with its wings intact
is also unable to fly, it does not fully capture what it means to be free.
Positive freedom can also be conceived in much thicker terms, as denoting a kind
of “self-realization,”48 “self-mastery,”49 or “self-determination.”50 This is the sense
in which the term “autonomy” has traditionally been used.51 The difference between

persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him
with any evil in case he do otherwise.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1998).
44. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 387–88 (Mary J. Gregor ed. &
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (asserting that individual freedom may be legally
restricted so that the free use of one’s choice can co-exist with everyone else’s freedom under
a universal law); MILL, supra note 43, at 14 (“[T]he only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others.”).
45. See TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 213–14.
46. John Bramhall, A Defence of True Liberty, in HOBBES & BRAMHALL ON LIBERTY &
NECESSITY 43, 44 (Vere Chappell ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999); see also Morris R.
Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 560 (1933) (observing that the (negative)
freedom to make a million dollars is not meaningful if one finds oneself out of work).
47. John Dewey, Liberty and Social Control, in 11 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN
DEWEY 360, 360 (John J. McDermott and Jo Ann Boydston eds., Southern Illinois Univ. Press
2008); accord RAWLS, supra note 39, at 204 (distinguishing between “liberty” in the negative
sense and the “worth of liberty” in the sense of having the means to achieve one’s aims).
48. TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 215–17.
49. John Christman, Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom, 101 ETHICS 343, 344
(1991) (describing positive liberty not just in terms of the absence of constraint but also in
terms of a “capacity for self-mastery and self-government”).
50. See JOHN GRAY, On Negative and Positive Liberty, in LIBERALISMS: ESSAYS IN
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 45, 57 (1989).
51. “Autonomy” literally means self-legislation, a characteristic originally exemplified
by Greek city-states that created their own laws rather than have them handed down by foreign
powers or home-grown tyrants. It was not until the Enlightenment that autonomy came to be
seen as a property of the individual—what Immanuel Kant and others described as a “property
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a thin conception of positive liberty and a thicker conception qua autonomy is that
the focus of the former is on the ability to do things, whereas the focus of the latter
is on the capacity to be a certain type of rational, independent-thinking person—one
who determines the course of her own life rather than have it be determined for her
by tradition, peer pressure, or the force of habit.52 This capacity has sometimes been
described as the ability to make choices about one’s choices.53 That is, a person is
autonomous in the thick sense not just because she is free to exercise certain
first-order choices such as whether to smoke a cigarette on any given day; rather, she
is free because she is able to (and does) make second-order choices about her
first-order choices, such as by choosing to quit smoking altogether. This is the sense
in which Gerald Dworkin describes autonomy as a
second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their
first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to
accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and
values. By exercising such a capacity, persons define their nature, give
meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind
of person they are.54
Thicker conceptions of positive liberty qua autonomy highlight the extent to which
the mere absence of external constraints, whether on opportunity or exercise, cannot
be the whole picture. Internal constraints such as fear, false consciousness,
inadequate information or understanding, lack of motivation, dependency, or poor
judgment become salient in a way they are not for negative liberty (or even thin
positive liberty) theories.55

which will has of being a law to itself.” IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC
114 (H. J. Paton trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964) (1785); accord JEAN JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 16 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950) (describing
autonomy as “obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves”).
52. STANLEY I. BENN, A THEORY OF FREEDOM 176–77 (1988) (“The heteronomous
person, however, receives his nomos ready-made, as a well-trained, well-drilled solider may
live punctiliously according to the Manual of Military Law and battalion orders.” (italics in
original)); Christman, supra note 49, at 344–45.
53. See GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 12–20 (1988);
Christman, supra note 49, at 346. But see Onora O’Neill, Autonomy, Coherence and
Independence, in LIBERALISM, CITIZENSHIP AND AUTONOMY 203, 207–08 (David Milligan &
William Watts Miller eds., 1992) (arguing that the idea of autonomy cannot be fully captured
in terms of the ability to form preferences about one’s preferences). See generally Harry G.
Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL 5 (1971)
(distinguishing between the ability to make choices and the ability to make choices about one’s
choices).
54. DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 20. John Christman likewise describes autonomy as
something “more than having a certain attitude toward one’s desires . . . . [i]t means . . . that
one’s values were formed in a manner or by a process that one had (or could have had)
something to say about.” Christman, supra note 49, at 346.
55. See BENN, supra note 52, at 154; TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 215–16 (“You are not
free if you are motivated, through fear, inauthentically internalized standards, or false
consciousness, to thwart your self-realization.”); Christman, supra note 49, at 344–45; Joel
Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 105, 110–12 (1971).
OF MORALS
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There are at least two consequences of a positive conception of freedom. First,
whereas negative liberty theories seek to minimize the role of the state,56 positive
liberty theories are not only hospitable to but also sometimes require active state
assistance in the form of education, subsidies, or other social services designed to
enable the full or meaningful realization of freedom.57 Second, unlike negative
liberty theories, positive liberty theories cannot claim to be value neutral. To see how
this is the case, consider two hypothetical settings58: The first is a city in which
religious freedom is tolerated but in which every intersection has a traffic light. The
second is a city in which there are no traffic lights but a local ordinance prohibits
religious prayer in public spaces. In which city is there less (positive) freedom? Most
people would likely answer the second, but the real question is why. It cannot be
because the second city restricts more bare opportunities for free choice, for traffic
lights apply to everyone (even atheists) and they restrict us in more places and at
more times of the day than the religious ordinance (after all, few people have the
need or desire to pray in public multiple times a day). Instead, it is because religion
has great meaning and worth in our lives, such that the slightest reduction in the
opportunity to pray is taken as a serious assault on our freedom.59 The freedom to
drive unimpeded through busy city streets, by contrast, has comparatively little value
especially when considered against the benefits of coordinating traffic flow—so
little, in fact, that we likely do not even register the many periods that we are stuck
at a red light as an unfreedom.60 This leads Charles Taylor to conclude that
“[positive] freedom requires a background conception of what is significant,
according to which some restrictions are seen to be without relevance for freedom
altogether, and others are judged as being of greater and lesser importance.”61
Making these distinctions, however, invariably requires importing normative
judgments that can often betray a greater commitment to substantive values than to
bare freedom of choice. And if so, state intervention designed to deter or punish bad
choices and promote good ones may become unobjectionable the closer one hews to

56. See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 40 (advocating a “night-watchman state”).
57. Cass Sunstein takes such a view when he argues that real freedom of choice might
require educating parties before they enter into certain contracts. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Disrupting Voluntary Transactions, in MARKETS AND JUSTICE 279, 282 (John W. Chapman &
J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989).
58. I have adapted this hypothetical slightly from Charles Taylor. See TAYLOR, supra note
34, at 218–19.
59. Richard Arneson makes a similar point with the colorful example of a recently
released prisoner who is unable to move his thumbs because they are cast in splints. The extent
to which we believe the parolee to be positively free depends not on the sheer number of thumb
movements that he is now precluded from pursuing, but rather in the worth or value of the
movements that are now foreclosed. If he were a member of a religious cult that placed
enormous significance on the ability to manipulate one’s thumbs in different positions for
ritual purposes, for example, it would dramatically change our assessment of his positive
liberty even though the same number of acts were foreclosed. Richard J. Arneson, “Freedom
and Desire,” 15 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 425, 426–27 (1985).
60. As Taylor explains, “It is not just a matter of our having made a trade-off, and
considered that a small loss of liberty was worth fewer traffic accidents . . . we are reluctant to
speak here of a loss of liberty at all . . . .” TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 218 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 219.
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a positive liberty view.62 A good example here is T.H. Green, who once argued that
until society reaches a certain stage of enlightenment, intrusive government
regulation in the form of health, education, and labor laws is justified in order to help
individuals realize their “real freedom.”63
The problem is that if restricting choice can be justified as compatible with
positive liberty, the very distinction between freedom and coercion begins to
collapse.64 As Berlin well recognized, this is a slippery slope toward something far
worse than paternalism:
Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of
men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on
behalf, of their “real” selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is
the true goal of man (happiness, performance of duty, wisdom, a just
society, self-fulfilment) must be identical with his freedom . . . . 65
The further we go down the road toward thick and thicker versions of positive liberty,
therefore, the more we seem to import substantive values that stray from the ideal of
private ordering. This is perhaps one reason why the dominant conception of
autonomy in both liberal theory and contract theory alike is that of negative liberty.66
B. Negative and Positive Interpretations of the Autonomy Thesis
1. Autonomy as Negative Liberty
More often than not, “autonomy” in the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence has
come to signify the wide latitude—virtually unknown in litigation—that parties
enjoy to make any number of process choices. For example, parties may choose what
issues to arbitrate (if any), how the arbitration will be conducted (including

62. See, e.g., Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and Fall,”
79 B.U. L. REV. 263, 288 (1999) (“Positive freedom thus might support a broad range of
regulatory legislation.”).
63. Green, supra note 42, at 26.
64. Cf. Pettit, supra note 62, at 289 (noting that such a position allows “those arguing for
labor legislation . . . or for the unconscionability of a contract [to] claim that they are arguing
for freedom”).
65. BERLIN, supra note 30, at 133; see also ISAIAH BERLIN, “From Hope and Fear Set
Free,” in CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES 173 (Henry Hardy ed., 1978).
66. See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 107 (2004); see also id. at 47 (“In
practice . . . nearly all rights theories regard contractual rights as classically individualist or
‘negative-liberty’ rights.”). It should come as no surprise that the chief architects of classical
contract law, such as Christopher Columbus Langdell and Oliver Wendell Holmes were arch
formalists who generally advocated the notion that “no one should be liable to anyone for
anything.” GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 15 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 1995).
As Gilmore explained, “[s]ince [that] ideal was not attainable, the compromise solution [in
contract law] was to restrict liability within the narrowest possible limits.” Id.; see also id. at
22–23, 47–49.
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applicable procedural and evidentiary rules), and who will adjudicate their dispute.67
As the Court has often remarked,
the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed
to do so nor does it prevent parties who do agree to arbitrate from
excluding certain claims from the scope of their arbitration
agreement. . . . Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not
coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration
agreements as they see fit.68
In other words, autonomy consists in not being “prevent[ed]”—that is, in having the
bare opportunity to make process choices without “coercion” by others or by the
state.
This conception of autonomy as negative liberty is apparent in several key
arbitration decisions from the Court. Consider Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto.69 There, the Court held that a Montana statute requiring arbitration clauses
to be printed in underlined capital letters on the front page of the container contract
was preempted by the FAA’s contrary injunction to “‘ensur[e] that private
agreements to arbitrate’ are enforced according to their terms.”70 Critics of the
decision argued that the statute should not have been preempted because it was
actually consistent with the fundamental principle of “autonomy” in arbitration. For
by bringing the clause to the immediate attention of the adherent, they claimed, the
statute helped ensure that she would make a more informed and reasoned decision
about arbitration (whatever that decision ultimately turned out to be).71 In rejecting
this argument, the Court came down squarely on the side of negative liberty: states
may not help weaker parties like the franchisees in Casarotto make better, more
informed choices because paternalistic legislation of this sort does not improve
anyone’s freedom. Instead, it compromises the drafting party’s freedom to enforce

67. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 683 (2010); Gary B.
Born, Keynote Address: Arbitration and the Freedom To Associate, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 7, 16 (2009) (“If the parties desire a fast-track arbitration, one that is over and done within
three months, they can agree to that. If the parties desire a documents-only arbitration, because
they do not want to incur significant expense in having their dispute resolved, they can agree
to that.” (footnote omitted)).
68. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
478–79 (1989) (citations omitted). This rationale is cited in one form or another in many
of the Court’s recent decisions. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.
Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749,
1757 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 681–84; EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S.
279, 293–94 (2002); see also Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2071
(2013) (Alito, J., concurring).
69. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
70. Id. at 688 (alteration in original) (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479).
71. See Edward Brunet, The Appropriate Role of State Law in the Federal Arbitration
System: Choice and Preemption, in BRUNET ET AL., supra note 16, at 63, 69; Margaret L.
Moses, Privatized “Justice,” 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535, 542 (2005); Sternlight, supra note 21,
at 668 (arguing that the purpose of the FAA was to “promote arbitration that is knowingly
selected by the parties”).
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agreements that both parties chose willingly. On this view, freedom is better
safeguarded by staying out of the parties’ business altogether.
Consider also Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University.72 There, the parties had agreed to arbitrate under the
California Arbitration Act (CAA), which permits courts to stay arbitration pending
related litigation if “there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of
law or fact.”73 By contrast, the FAA’s pro-arbitration approach requires courts to
compel arbitration at once even if there are related claims pending in court that
involve third parties to the arbitration agreement,74 which in turn helps promote
recourse to the arbitral forum and further other values associated with arbitration,
such as speed and efficiency.75 The question presented was whether the CAA’s stay
provision stood as an obstacle to those purposes and objectives and thus should be
preempted. The Court’s answer was that not even the pro-arbitration policies behind
the FAA could trump the parties’ freedom of choice: “There is no federal policy
favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is
simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements
to arbitrate.”76
Volt reveals the extent of arbitration law’s commitment to the liberal principle of
value neutrality: respect for party autonomy demands respecting the parties’ freedom
to make even bad or irrational choices, such as by opting into state arbitration
schemes that are less solicitous of arbitration than the FAA and thus arguably
inconsistent with the “national policy favoring arbitration.”77 Many commentators
share this assessment of arbitration law. Rau, for example, has argued that “[s]ince
arbitration has no virtues other than what the parties themselves happen to find in it,”
arbitration law forbids courts and legislatures from “imposing a particular image of
arbitration on [the parties] against their will.”78 On this view, true freedom consists
of the absence of constraints on the parties’ choices rather than the pursuit of good

72. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
73. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(c) (West 2007); see also Volt, 489 U.S. at 471.
74. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
75. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); see
also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220–21 (1985).
76. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476; accord Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S.
662, 683 (2010) (“[P]arties may agree to limit the issues they choose to arbitrate and may
agree on rules under which any arbitration will proceed. They may choose who will resolve
specific disputes . . . . [and they] may specify with whom they choose to arbitrate their
disputes.” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)).
77. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
78. Alan Scott Rau, Fear of Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 469, 479 (2006) (emphasis
added); see also Bermann, supra note 19, at 1013 (“[T]he federal interest in arbitration does
not consist of enforcing agreements to arbitrate according to some sort of abstract or ideal
arbitral model, but rather according to the particular arbitral model upon which the parties had
agreed.”).
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choices.79 To the extent Volt and cases like it can be described as a “paean to party
autonomy,”80 therefore, it is to autonomy qua negative liberty.
Casarotto and Volt are not outliers; they are of a piece with the increasingly strong
negative liberty and even libertarian orientation of the Court’s modern arbitration
jurisprudence.81 In this jurisprudence, freedom of contract—in the sense of both
maximal enforcement and minimal regulation—has become a paramount value.82
2. Autonomy as Positive Liberty
Although arbitration law takes the autonomy thesis as a straightforward claim
about negative liberty, in arbitration scholarship the thesis has sometimes been
conceived along the lines that “autonomy” has traditionally been understood in
philosophical discourse: as suggesting a capacity for self-government more so than
mere freedom from constraint. This is evident in the frequent claim that arbitration
is a vehicle of “self-regulation”83 or “self-determination,”84 suggesting not so much
a simple freedom to choose as a capacity to make sensible, informed, and reflective
dispute-resolution choices that (ideally) result in something qualitatively superior to
the default of litigation. Gary Born offers the following vivid—if perhaps

79. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995)
(“[A]rbitration is simply a matter of contract . . . ; it is a way to resolve those disputes—but
only those disputes—that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.”); Volt, 489 U.S. at
478; Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219.
80. See Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
225, 234 n.40 (1997).
81. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability after Doctor’s Associates,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1996); accord Carbonneau, Contract
Freedom, supra note 1, at 1195 (arguing that modern U.S. arbitration law has severely
undercut “the role of the state and the prospect of state regulation”).
82. Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.
331, 334 (criticizing the Court’s FAA jurisprudence as predicated on a “blind commitment to
freedom of contract”); Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration:
Whither Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1335, 1336–37 (1996) (arguing that the Court’s FAA
jurisprudence has emphasized “freedom to contract” at the expense of “freedom from
contract”); Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting out of
Government’s Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
529, 535 (1994) (“[T]he FAA’s core is freedom of contract with respect to arbitration
agreements . . . .”).
83. FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND
ACHIEVEMENTS 4 (1st ed. 1948) (describing arbitration as a form of “self-regulation . . . [that]
embodies the principles of independence, self-reliance, equality, integrity, and
responsibility”); 1 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT § 3.2.1 (Supp. 1999).
84. Rau, supra note 1, at 486. In addition to arbitration, other types of contract procedures,
such as choice-of-forum clauses, have also been justified based on the ideal of
self-government. E.g., Martin H. Redish, Case One: Choice of Forum Clauses, 29 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 545, 548 (1995) (arguing that enforcement of forum selection clauses comports with
“values of individual self-determination”).
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counterfactual—description of how this type of thick positive liberty might manifest
itself in a commercial arbitration agreement:
[P]arties . . . take care to draft and tailor their dispute resolution
mechanism specifically to suit their particular relationship. . . . [They]
act to define and structure not just their dispute resolution mechanism,
but also their underlying relationship itself; they act to safeguard their
shared association with one another against the disputes which will
inevitably arise and against the process of dispute resolution. Parties
choose arbitration not just because of its characteristics as a dispute
resolution mechanism, but because of their ability jointly to determine
how the process of dispute resolution will affect their underlying
relationship with one another.85
Ironically, the best and strongest examples of a positive liberty interpretation of
the autonomy thesis come from critics of so-called mandatory binding arbitration.
For example, Paul Carrington and Paul Haagen argue that unsophisticated parties
who enter pre-dispute arbitration agreements do not manifest “true” assent or
“genuine” freedom of contract,86 either because they are unlikely to have read or
understood the agreement or because they did not have the leverage to negotiate
around it.87 The implication is that real freedom of contract in this context requires a
certain capacity for autonomous decision making—a capacity that rarely exists in
actual fact. Likewise, Margaret Jane Radin contends that by clicking “I agree” to
boilerplate arbitration clauses, consumers are typically not acting independently or
reflectively, and thus not autonomously.88 For Radin, freedom is just as much a
function of internal constraints such as lack of information and cognitive biases as it
is of external constraints such as duress.89 This is why she argues that the devolution
of contractual assent from “true” consent to something like “fictional . . . opportunity
to assent” or “constructive notice of terms”90 poses a serious problem for traditional,
autonomy-based justifications for enforcement.
A similar commitment to positive liberty drives longstanding efforts to amend the
FAA, the latest expression of which is the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015 currently
pending in Congress. The Act seeks to void only pre-dispute arbitration agreements,
on the theory that when a party agrees to arbitrate before an actual dispute has arisen
she has “no meaningful choice.”91 Only after the contours of a dispute become

85. Born, supra note 67, at 17 (emphasis added).
86. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 82, at 340; see also Sternlight, supra note 21, at
675–77.
87. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 82, at 334–35, 340; see also Sternlight, supra note
21, at 676–77.
88. MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW 88–90 (2013).
89. Id. at 23–29. Radin has elsewhere argued for market inalienability in particular
contexts on the ground that it would be consistent with promoting positive liberty. Margaret
Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1903–05 (1987).
90. RADIN, supra note 88, at 83.
91. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. § 2(3) (2015).
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known, the argument goes, can a choice be “truly voluntary.”92 Note that in each of
these cases, the claim is not necessarily that freedom of choice should be
subordinated to other public values. Instead, the claim is that the exercise of that
freedom will be qualitatively superior if certain (predispute) choices are removed.93
In sharp contrast, libertarian or negative liberty defenders of arbitration law argue
against drawing such distinctions about the quality of choice.94 To them, freedom is
just the absence of coercion or duress.95 As long as nothing or nobody is preventing
the consumer from “put[ting] the pen down without signing the form,” the consumer
has acted freely and thus autonomously.96 Not even substantively unconscionable
contracts or contracts procured by undue influence are “unfree,” on this view, for the
simple reason that neither involves the type of external compulsion that rises to the
level of duress.97
Here it bears noting that positive liberty claims are not confined to the mandatory
binding arbitration context. A good example is the work of Thomas Stipanowich,
who is broadly supportive of arbitration. To be sure, Stipanowich sometimes wears
his negative liberty stripes when he claims that the “opportunity for choice . . . is the
one overriding value of arbitration, enabling arbitration to take many different forms
and respond to many different needs and circumstances.”98 Otherwise put, “the single

92. Id. § 2(5).
93. See, e.g., Carrington & Haagen, supra note 82, at 339–46 (interpreting the old English
revocability doctrine, by which a party could “revoke” pre-dispute arbitration agreements, as
a means “to assure true assent”).
94. See, e.g., Ware, supra note 81, at 1033 (eschewing the question of what constitutes
“meaningful choice”).
95. Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (with a
Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 201 n.23 (1998)
[hereinafter Ware, Consumer Arbitration]. Ware’s precise claim here is that “[c]ontracting
in the absence of duress is contracting voluntarily.” Id. Ware refers the reader at this juncture
to another article, in which he essentially defines “voluntarily” to mean “freely” and its
opposite to mean “coerced.” Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary
Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 109 (1996) [hereinafter Ware, Employment Arbitration].
He argues that “one’s consent must be either voluntary or coerced; it cannot be both.” Id.
Thus, any choice—no matter how poor, uninformed, or otherwise encumbered—is free just
to the extent it is uncoerced. See id. at 109–13, 120–26. This is classic libertarianism. See, e.g.,
HAYEK, supra note 32, at 137 (arguing that “[e]ven if the threat of starvation to me and perhaps
to my family impels me to accept a distasteful job at a very low wage, even if I am ‘at the
mercy’ of the only man willing to employ me,” I am still free in the negative sense); NOZICK,
supra note 40, at 262–64 (“A person’s choice among differing degrees of unpalatable
alternatives is not rendered nonvoluntary by the fact that others voluntarily chose and acted
within their rights in a way that did not provide him with a more palatable alternative.”).
96. Ware, Consumer Arbitration, supra note 95, at 201.
97. Ware, Employment Arbitration, supra note 95, at 127 (arguing that unconscionability
reflects a determination that certain contracts should not be enforced “even though they are
the product of voluntary consent”—that is, that “voluntary consent . . . [should be]
subordinate[d] . . . to other values”). By the same token, because undue influence requires
“unfair persuasion,” Ware believes it, too, is predicated on a substantive judgment about the
type of contracts the law should enforce rather than on a (value-neutral) judgment about what
counts as free choice. See id. at 127 n.226.
98. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of Commercial
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most important advantage of binding arbitration” is “the flexibility to make
arbitration what you want it to be”99—irrespective, that is, of your ability to exercise
that freedom.
But Stipanowich also recognizes that the mere “possibility of choice” does not
necessarily translate into “real, practical choices.”100 For example, he reports that
even sophisticated users such as business executives face significant hurdles to the
meaningful exercise of autonomy, such as “lack of relevant knowledge,”101 bad
habits or attitudes,102 “inexperience,” or the difficulty of having frank coversations
about possible future conflicts.103 This leads him to conclude that “[f]or most
business users,” real freedom of choice “is an illusion.”104
Even when such users have the capability or resources to take full advantage of
that freedom, Stipanowich laments that they typically choose not to do so.105 For
example, they often delegate important decisions to others, such as transactional
counsel, who give scant thought to dispute-resolution provisions until the eleventh
hour106 or litigators who end up co-opting arbitration into little more than a privatized
version of judicial procedure.107 In other words, they stop exercising all the qualities
that Berlin identified of the autonomous agent: “to be a subject, not an object . . .
deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature
or by other men . . . conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them.”108
As a result, the value proposition of “classic” arbitration is undermined.
Unnecessarily contentious motion practice and discovery come to corrupt
arbitration’s traditional emphasis on securing a speedy and effective hearing on the
merits. Arbitration becomes the “new litigation.”109
From a pure negative liberty standpoint that prizes value neutrality, it is difficult
to understand Stipanowich’s complaint. Qua negative liberty, autonomy just means,
“to each his own.” If the parties have chosen (without coercion) a process with all
the trappings of full-bore litigation, or chosen to surrender that choice to their
counsel, what is the problem? Brunet anticipated this precise rejoinder to
Stipanowich more than a decade ago. Observing that parties were increasingly opting
for a “judicialized” model of arbitration by agreeing to provisions for discovery,

Arbitration: Challenges, Opportunities, Proposals, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 297, 316–17
(2014) (emphasis added).
99. Stipanowich, supra note 13, at 51 (emphasis added).
100. Stipanowich, supra note 98, at 318; see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and
Choice: Taking Charge of the “New Litigation,” 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383, 386 (2009)
(urging the need to “promote real choices in arbitration”).
101. Stipanowich, supra note 98, at 314.
102. Id. at 309.
103. Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 388–90; Stipanowich, supra note 98, at 315–16.
104. Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 386; accord Stipanowich, supra note 98, at 309
(stating that even sophisticated parties are only nominally “choosing,” not choosing well or
making good choices).
105. Stipanowich, supra note 98, at 314 (observing that parties “fail[] to take advantage of
the choices inherent in arbitration”).
106. Id. at 314–15.
107. Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 392.
108. BERLIN, supra note 30, at 131.
109. See generally Stipanowich, supra note 13.
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motion practice, and even judicial review, Brunet argued that the autonomy thesis
required honoring such choices no matter how much they ended up transforming
arbitration into litigation.110
It is only by construing the autonomy thesis as a claim about positive liberty that
Stipanowich can draw the lines that he wishes to draw—that is, to claim that some
choices are “good,” “worse,” or “better” than others.111 In other words, autonomy for
Stipanowich is not just an opportunity concept; it is also an exercise concept. It is
precisely because he has a conception of what exercising true or meaningful
autonomy is and why it is valuable that Stipanowich can urge parties to “exert greater
control over their destiny in arbitration,”112 to “be more deliberate in taking
advantage of the spectrum of available choices,”113 and to have access to greater
“discernment[,] . . . . knowledge, experience, and sound judgment” in arbitration
matters.114
II. DOES THE AUTONOMY THESIS EXPLAIN THE RIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT OF
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS?
Why is it important whether the autonomy thesis is construed as a claim about
negative or positive liberty? The answer has to do with the fact that “autonomy” has
been the principal policy rationale to support the proposition that arbitration
agreements must be enforced strictly “‘according to their terms.’”115 For example,
Ware argues that enforcing arbitration clauses “advances the parties’ freedom to
define their legal rights and obligations as they wish.”116 Brunet reasons that “[i]n a
state such as ours characterized by the respect for individual liberty, courts should
enforce customized agreements to arbitrate and the legislature should regulate

110. Brunet, supra note 12, at 45, 84–86. Brunet’s negative liberty orientation in this
context is in sharp tension with the positive liberty orientation he adopts in his defense of the
Montana statute at issue in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). See
supra note 71 and accompanying text. This tends to confirm my observation that courts and
commentators have used crucial terms like “autonomy” without attempting to understand what
it really means and what it requires.
111. Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 394, 400; Stipanowich, supra note 98, at 309
(lamenting “the habits and attitudes of business ‘users’ and counsel” that often prevent
“making good choices regarding arbitration” (emphasis added)).
112. Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 401.
113. Stipanowich, supra note 13, at 52.
114. Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 436.
115. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (quoting
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989));
accord Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995) (“[T]he basic
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome courts’ refusals to enforce agreements
to arbitrate.”); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) .
116. Ware, supra note 82, at 555; see also Brunet, supra note 12, at 84 (arguing for broad
“party autonomy to fashion arbitration procedures deemed essential by the contracting
partners”); Ware, Employment Arbitration, supra note 95, at 86 (“[C]ontemporary arbitration
law . . . is well-suited to ensure that disputes are resolved by arbitration only when the
disputants have voluntarily consented to that. The argument was that contract law enforces
only duties assumed through voluntary consent . . . .”).
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minimally.”117 In Stipanowich’s view, modern arbitration statutes such as the FAA
strengthened the enforcement of arbitration agreements in order to promote party
autonomy.118
For these and other commentators, enforcement follows naturally—even
axiomatically—from a commitment to the autonomy thesis. The animating idea
appears to be that enforcement does little more than respect or give effect to the
parties’ free choices. The corollary is that when the state regulates arbitration
agreements, it imposes external values that invariably frustrate those choices. But as
we shall see, depending on how one understands “autonomy,” the autonomy thesis
may or may not support enforcing arbitration agreements; indeed, most of the time it
appears to require just the opposite.
My analysis will have implications for contract theory more generally, which also
appeals to autonomy as an affirmative argument for enforcement. But the precise
conclusion I draw is less problematic for contract theory than it is for the Court’s
arbitration jurisprudence for at least two reasons. First, contract theory’s more
eclectic foundations mean that there is no widespread consensus on the notion that
the value of autonomy trumps all other values—that is, there is no equivalent of an
“autonomy thesis.” Instead, contract theory candidly acknowledges the limitations
of a pure autonomy-based justification for enforcement and recognizes the
importance of other normative commitments, such as efficiency, equity, and the
morality of promising. Second, contract theory is not committed to minimizing state
regulation—and thus to “rigorous” enforcement—in quite the same way as the
Court’s modern arbitration jurisprudence. State legislation and public policy
currently make contracts unenforceable in a wide variety of contexts (consumer,
insurance, investment, and landlord-tenant, to name a few). Thus, contract theory
appreciates that valuing autonomy does not require untrammeled enforcement.
But the tension between autonomy and enforcement becomes a much bigger
problem in the arbitration area. First, until recently, alternative rationales for
enforcement have played a comparatively minor role in arbitration jurisprudence. For
example, the autonomy thesis has led the Court to hold that autonomy arguments
always trump efficiency arguments.119 Second, arbitration agreements are enforced
even more stringently than other contracts. For example, FAA preemption means
that arbitration agreements are effectively immune from state legislation and public

117. Brunet, supra note 16, at 5.
118. Stipanowich, supra note 18, at 430 (“Arbitration law promotes the autonomy of
parties by enforcing their agreements to arbitrate . . . .”).
119. See, e.g., Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 (enforcing arbitration clause despite defendant’s
argument that doing so would create inefficiencies in the form of conflicting rulings on a
common issue of law or fact); Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 220–21 (enforcing arbitration clause
despite plaintiff’s argument that doing so would result in delay and other inefficiencies);
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983) (enforcing
arbitration clause despite plaintiff’s argument that compelling arbitration was inefficient
because it would require related disputes to be resolved in separate arbitral and judicial forums
rather than being consolidated before a court of law). In its more recent jurisprudence,
however, the Court has shown an increasing solicitude for efficiency values. See AT&T
Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (describing freedom of contract
as a means to the end of efficiency).
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policy, which ordinarily render contracts unenforceable in a wide variety of
settings.120 In addition, FAA section 4 effectively requires courts to grant specific
performance upon proof of a valid arbitration agreement,121 whereas in most other
contexts courts retain the discretion to withhold such equitable remedies.122 For these
and other reasons, many commentators now contend that arbitration agreements have
evolved into a kind of “super contract.”123 But if autonomy does not point
unproblematically in the direction of enforcement to begin with, it is difficult to
appreciate why arbitration agreements should be enforced even more stringently than
contracts generally.
A. Negative Liberty and the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements
As explained in Part I.B, arbitration law conceives of the autonomy thesis largely
in negative liberty terms. But negative liberty presents at best an awkward
justification for the rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements.124

120. Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1271–72.
121. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012); Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 218 (“By its terms, the Act leaves no
place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts
shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement
has been signed.” (emphasis in original)); see also Philip G. Phillips, A Lawyer’s Approach to
Commercial Arbitration, 44 YALE L.J. 31, 33 (1934) (reasoning that the FAA’s mandatory
language prevents courts from “refus[ing] specific performance of arbitration on grounds
which heretofore have influenced chancellors and legal scholars to favor refusal of equitable
relief”); Sidney P. Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. PA. L. REV.
160, 164, 172 (1934) (arguing that the FAA mandates specific performance for arbitration
agreements, leaving no room for the court’s exercise of equitable discretion); Legislation,
Statutory Tinkering with Specific Performance, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1036, 1041 (1934)
(observing that “the discretion of the equity court has been strikingly narrowed by statutes
which purport to make mandatory the granting of specific performance of arbitration”).
122. 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357(1) (1981) (“Subject to the rules
stated in §§ 359–69, specific performance of a contract duty will be granted in the discretion
of the court . . . .”); id. § 357 cmt. c (“The granting of equitable relief has traditionally been
regarded as within judicial discretion.”).
123. Tom Carbonneau, A Comment upon Professor Park’s Analysis of the Dicta in First
Options v. Kaplan, MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., Nov. 1996, at 18, 19 (“Kaplan and its
antecedents convert arbitration agreements into ‘super’ contracts of adjudication that can
dislodge entirely the operation of law from private litigation.”); Thomas J. Stipanowich,
Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1997)
(“[T]oday, the agreement to arbitrate is effectively a ‘superclause’ that is specifically
enforceable even in the face of allegations that the contract of which it is a part was induced
by fraud or is otherwise avoidable.”); David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by
Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of
Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1127–37 (2002) (describing pre-litigation
agreements, in particular arbitration agreements, as super contracts because they are routinely
enforced through specific performance and because traditional contract and public policy
defenses have had limited effect). See generally Richard Frankel, The Arbitration Clause as
Super Contract, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 531 (2014).
124. Others have made the same observation outside the arbitration context. See, e.g.,
Brilmayer, supra note 36.
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Negative liberty arguments are most persuasive as against regulation that
prohibits or prevents people from doing as they please—for example, when the state
subjects certain conduct to tortious or criminal liability. But as I argue in Part II.A.1
below, when the state regulates arbitration agreements (such as through
consumer-protection statutes or other measures) it typically does not impose any
legal constraints on action; instead, it merely refuses to help one party enforce an
agreement that fails to comply with the regulation. Both parties remain negatively
free to follow through with the agreement if they so desire. Enforcement, in other
words, is a type of state assistance rather than interference. Regulation making
arbitration agreements unenforceable is just the withdrawal of that assistance and,
for that reason, does not in any meaningful sense restrict negative liberty.
In Part II.A.2, I argue that negative liberty arguments are even less persuasive
when it comes to making the affirmative case for enforcing arbitration agreements.
Negative liberty theorists make it seem as if enforcement simply leaves the parties
free to do as they wish. But the reality is that in practically any action for
enforcement, one party no longer wishes to be bound. It is difficult to explain how
coercing that party to arbitrate is consistent with her negative liberty; to the contrary,
negative liberty would appear more consistent with the freedom to change one’s
mind.
1. Regulating Enforcement Does Not Compromise Negative Liberty
In a seminal essay, Richard Epstein argued that when a court refuses to enforce a
contract for reasons that go to the substance of the bargain, it “impos[es] upon the
parties its own views about their rights and duties.”125 Rather than simply leaving the
parties where it finds them, it actually interferes with their freedom of action
conceived in negative terms. Epstein explains:
One of the first functions of the law is to guarantee to individuals a sphere
of influence in which they will be able to operate, without having to
justify themselves to the state or to third parties: if one individual is
entitled to do within the confines of the tort law what he pleases with
what he owns, then two individuals who operate with those same
constraints should have the same right with respect to their mutual
affairs against the rest of the world.126
From this, Epstein concludes that contracts should be enforced with minimal
(substantive) regulation by the state.
The Epstein quotation exemplifies a common tendency to write as if the law
should guarantee maximal enforcement to contracts between two individuals for
much the same reason that it guarantees each individual maximal freedom from
regulation other than tort law. The trouble is that enforcing a contract is hardly the

125. Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293,
293 (1975) (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 293–94 (emphasis added).
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same thing as allowing individuals to associate with one another.127 It is one thing to
argue that if a tenant of a residential apartment building is free to play Bach partitas
past 11:00 p.m., two tenants should also be free to combine and play Bartok duets
past 11:00 p.m. For here, one person’s freedom from restrictive rules about noise is
simply being extended to permit a like freedom to two persons. But it is quite another
to argue that when two tenants make a contract to play Bartok duets sometime in the
future, neither of them is free unilaterally to change her mind at a later point in time.
At most, promoting the first tenant’s negative liberty would require that two tenants
should not be prohibited from playing or planning to play together after 11:00 p.m.,
not that the landlord (or perhaps even the state) should marshal its resources to
enforce their agreement to play in the future.
H. L. A. Hart’s distinction between “duty-imposing” and “power-conferring”
rules provides a helpful framework for unpacking this argument. As Hart describes
them, duty-imposing rules are non-optional in the sense that they “set[] up and
defin[e] certain kinds of conduct as something to be avoided or done by those to
whom it applies, irrespective of their wishes.”128 This is what gives such rules the
structure of “orders backed by threats.”129 Good examples are negligent torts and
antidiscrimination law, both of which define certain acts or transactions as a wrong
subject to compensation or penalties.130
By contrast, power-conferring rules “provide individuals with facilities for
realizing their wishes, by conferring legal powers upon them to create, by certain
specified procedures and subject to certain conditions, structures of rights and duties
within the coercive framework of the law.”131 Good examples include the law of
contracts and the rules of civil procedure.132 There are no ex ante duties to create

127. In the arbitration context, Gary Born makes an argument similar to Epstein’s when he
links the development of arbitration law in the West with the increasing emphasis not so much
on individual but rather on “associational” liberty. See Born, supra note 67, at 15–21. On this
view, the purpose of arbitration law would appear to be to leave the parties largely free to
“associate” (i.e., structure their arbitration process) as they see fit, with limited interference by
the state. To support this argument, Born traces the history of arbitration to trade associations,
medieval guilds, religious communities, and other groups for whom arbitration guaranteed
“maximum autonomy and control over the resolution of their disputes.” Id. at 17.
But the crux of modern arbitration law is to enforce arbitration agreements and awards
against reluctant parties—that is, to sever the parties’ association and facilitate an accounting
of who owes what to whom. It is plainly not to stay out of the parties’ business altogether, as
it once might have been in the case of self-regulating associations that enforced arbitration
agreements and awards internally, without recourse to courts of law.
128. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27 (2d ed. 1994).
129. Id. at 28.
130. See id. at 26–38 (defining a duty-imposing rule as a rule the disobedience of which is
a wrong subject to punishment or compensation). Duty-imposing rules can take the form of a
mandatory or a default rule. Antidiscrimination statutes can be thought of as a species of the
former because parties generally may not defeat the application of such laws through private
agreement. Negligent torts are an example of the latter insofar as parties are generally free to
contract around the duty of due care through exculpatory clauses.
131. Id. at 27–28 (emphasis added). The italicized portion highlights what makes this a
power-conferring rule rather than just the conferral of power.
132. Id. at 28–34. Gregory Klass has significantly refined Hart’s somewhat sweeping
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enforceable exchange relationships or bring an action in court; it is only to the extent
that parties wish to avail themselves of these forms of state assistance that they must
adhere to power-conferring rules such as contract doctrine, the rules of judicial
procedure, and other applicable legislation. A landlord who wishes to create an
enforceable contract, for instance, must (inter alia) refrain from making certain
misrepresentations and comply with applicable landlord-tenant statutes.133 Failing to
do so simply means that the state will not assist the landlord in enforcing the contract;
it does not constitute a “wrong” to which a sanction attaches.134
Sitting as it does at the crossroads of contract and procedure, arbitration law
consists largely of power-conferring rules—that is, of rules that stipulate the
conditions precedent for courts to enforce arbitration agreements and awards.135
Duty-imposing rules are largely beside the point in this arena because no state
currently makes it a crime or a tort to arbitrate disputes or to include or omit certain
provisions in arbitration agreements.136

assimilation of contract law to power-conferring rules. Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of
Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726 (2008) (arguing that
contract law is in truth a set of compound rules that exhibit both power-conferring and
duty-imposing features).
133. See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981) (misrepresentation); id.
§ 178 (public policy).
134. See HART, supra note 128, at 33–34. For a more detailed argument for why breach of
contract does not constitute a “wrong” in the first place, see infra notes 171–77 and
accompanying text.
135. The FAA itself, like other so-called modern U.S. arbitration statutes, is a set of
power-conferring rules. Its chief innovation was to assist parties in enforcing arbitration
agreements in a particular way—namely, through specific performance as a matter of right.
See Hiro N. Aragaki, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and the Antidiscrimination Theory of
FAA Preemption, 4 PENN. ST. Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 39, 46 (2013); Aragaki, supra note 23,
at 1947–49; see also Sales and Contracts To Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and
Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 6 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 Hearing] (question of Sen.
Thomas Walsh) (“[The purpose of the FAA was] to overcome the rule of equity, that equity
will not specifically enforce any arbitration agreement[.]”). The newfound availability of
specific performance for arbitration agreements simply opened up more meaningful avenues
of state assistance, such as in compelling arbitration, in staying existing litigation, and in
barring new litigation on the same subject.
The old common-law revocability doctrine—the doctrine that the FAA was designed to
overturn—was also a power-conferring rule. It did not make arbitration or arbitration
agreements illegal, since even prior to the New York Arbitration Law of 1920 parties were
free to enter pre-dispute arbitration agreements, follow through with them on their own accord,
obtain money damages in case of breach, and have any resulting award enforced as a judgment
of the court. Toledo S.S. Co. v. Zenith Transp. Co., 184 F. 391, 398–400 (6th Cir. 1911)
(holding that arbitration agreement may not be revoked after entry of award); Tobey v. Cnty.
of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065) (Story, J.) (same); Conn.
Fire Ins. Co. v. O’Fallon, 69 N.W. 118, 119 (Neb. 1896) (same). It simply made the power to
enforce an executory arbitration agreement using the remedy of specific performance
conditional on neither party revoking the agreement prior to an award.
136. There are, however, duty-imposing rules governing certain incidents of the arbitration
process, such as bribing an arbitrator. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 570.150 (West 1999 &
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Duty-imposing rules are a palpable restriction on negative liberty. An employer
subject to antidiscrimination laws is no longer free to hire or fire employees in any
way it wishes. Likewise, the duty of due care restricts our freedom to be careless,
irresponsible, and unreasonable in ways that injure or annoy others. But it is much
harder to appreciate how power-conferring rules likewise constrain autonomy qua
negative liberty. Rather than restrict freedom of choice, power-conferring rules allow
individuals to do what they could not do without state assistance—that is, they make
more choice possible. The rules themselves do not deprive persons of a bare freedom
to act;137 their effect is simply to withdraw certain benefits from parties who do not
comply with them.138 This leads contracts scholar Stephen Smith to conclude that
“[r]efusing to enforce a contract is not an interference with [negative] freedom” at
all.139
Consider again the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015. If passed, the effect of the
Act would be to place further conditions on the parties’ ability to avail themselves of
FAA section 2—namely, arbitration agreements involving consumers and employees
will qualify for enforcement only if they were formed post-dispute.140 The Act is
therefore a power-conferring rule rather than a duty-imposing rule: nothing in the
Act prevents consumers and large service providers such as AT&T from entering
arbitration agreements and following through with them if they so desire. The Act
merely provides that the state will not help one party enforce an arbitration agreement
or award in certain circumstances.141

Supp. 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-5-7 (LexisNexis 2014).
137. See SMITH, supra note 66, at 257 (making the same argument with regard to rules that
refuse enforcement of prostitution contracts); Samuel Freeman, Illiberal Libertarians: Why
Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 111–12 (2002) (making the
same argument in the context of discussing the basic compatibility between inalienability rules
and liberal theory).
It bears noting that, historically, freedom of contract arguments were often directed against
duty-imposing rules rather than power-conferring rules. Adam Smith, for example, argued
against criminal usury laws on the ground that they violated the “natural liberty” of free
exchange. ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 263 (Charles J. Bullock ed., Cosimo Classics
2007). Likewise, in the celebrated case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court
held that a penal statute making it a misdemeanor, inter alia, for a baked-goods establishment
to “require[] or permit[]” employees to work more than a certain number of hours per week,
id. at 46, was unconstitutional because it “interfer[ed] with their independence of judgment
and of action,” understood as the right to enter more so than enforce the contract, id. at 57.
138. See HART, supra note 128, at 34; SMITH, supra note 66, at 264–65 (discussing the
view that contract enforcement is a state-provided service, “in much the same way that the
state provides educational, recreational, or police services”).
139. SMITH, supra note 66, at 257. It is perhaps for this reason that the liberal tradition has
generally not considered the enforcement of contracts to be on par with basic rights of the
individual, such as freedom of conscience or freedom of association. See Freeman, supra note
137, at 108–09.
140. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015).
141. A similar point can be made about the common-law public policy defense, which
makes criminal or illegal contracts unenforceable. For many centuries, courts have justified
the defense on the ground that when the parties are in pari delicto, the plaintiff has “no right
to be assisted,” for “[n]o [c]ourt will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon
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Negative liberty theorists like Epstein sometimes elide the important distinction
between duty-imposing and power-conferring rules, which in turn helps them co-opt
straightforward autonomy arguments against the former into arguments against the
latter. As a result, power-conferring rules are misleadingly portrayed as a form of
active interference with private ordering, when in fact they merely place conditions
on the receipt of state benefits.142 Arguing against power-conferring rules such as the
Arbitration Fairness Act then comes to epitomize a “hands off,” laissez-faire
position, when in fact it is just the opposite.143
The doctrine of FAA preemption provides a good example of this confusion.
Pursuant to this doctrine, any state law that “‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution’” of the FAA’s purposes will be displaced or
preempted.144 Because the Court construes the FAA’s overriding purpose to be the
enforcement of arbitration agreements strictly according to their terms, the FAA
preempts any state law that impedes the enforcement of arbitration agreements.145
The only exceptions are “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract,” typically understood to mean common-law contract defenses.146
Courts and commentators often improperly characterize enforcement-impeding
state laws as restrictive or coercive, which in turn enables them to appeal to negative
liberty when justifying FAA preemption. Take AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,147 in
which the issue was whether the FAA should preempt an unconscionability
precedent set by the California high court in Discover Bank v. Superior Court.148
Discover Bank held that collective-action waivers were unconscionable when
contained in certain types of consumer adhesion contracts.149 It was therefore in the
nature of a power-conferring rule: compliance was necessary only to the extent the
drafter of an arbitration clause sought state assistance through enforcement.

an immoral or an illegal act.” Holman v. Johnson, [1775] 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B.)
(emphasis added); see also Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1907 (2011)
(“‘[A] court will not, on grounds of public policy, aid a promisee by enforcing the promise, . . . .
It will simply leave both parties as it finds them . . . .’” (quoting 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 197 cmt. a (1979))); McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669–70 (1899) (stating
that courts will “refuse to grant either party to an illegal contract judicial aid for the enforcement
of his alleged rights under it” and “will leave the parties as it finds them”).
142. See, e.g., infra notes 150–54, 213–14 and accompanying text; infra note 216.
143. This is just another iteration of the same move in other domains such as classical legal
thought and libertarianism, which have been skillfully exposed by many others. See, e.g., G.A.
COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY 56–61 (1995) (libertarianism); Freeman,
supra note 137, at 132 (libertarianism); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 491 (1923) (classical legalism).
144. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). For a more extensive discussion of FAA preemption,
see Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1241–48.
145. Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1242–45.
146. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1245–47.
147. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
148. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
149. See id. at 1110.
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Nonetheless, the Court portrayed Discover Bank as a duty-imposing rule—as a
“prohibition on collective-action waivers”150 that “superimpose[d]” or “require[d]”
class proceedings regardless of the parties’ explicit choice to the contrary.151 This
enabled the Court to reason that Discover Bank constituted an unwarranted
restriction or invasion of the parties’ freedom,152 and thus an affront to the autonomy
thesis. But as the Court was ultimately forced to concede, Discover Bank does not
actually “require” anything153—it merely withdraws the power to enforce class
waivers against a now reluctant party. Willing parties remain free to honor class
waivers despite Discover Bank, such as by refraining from bringing representative
actions.154
2. Enforcement Compromises the Negative Liberty of the Party Who No Longer
Wishes To Arbitrate
If the autonomy thesis is a claim about negative liberty, there is yet a further,
more acute problem when the thesis is used affirmatively to justify enforcement.
Courts and commentators assume that enforcement is non-coercive because it
merely “give[s] effect to the intent of the parties,”155 “advances the parties’
freedom to define their legal rights and obligations as they wish,”156 or gives

150. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 1752–53.
152. Id. at 1748–49 (explaining that parties enjoy wide “discretion in designing arbitration
processes,” such as to select applicable procedural rules and to choose arbitrators with
expertise in a given field). As the Court noted, the parties were free to choose even unwise
procedures that dilute the speed and efficiency gains ordinarily to be expected from arbitration.
For example, they “could agree to arbitrate pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
or pursuant to a discovery process rivaling that in litigation.” Id. at 1752 (emphasis in original).
153. Id. at 1750 (emphasis in original). Others have also noted this sleight of hand. See,
e.g., Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract: The New Trilogy, 22 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 435, 526–27 & n.308 (2011); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 707 (2012).
154. The Court made the same move when announcing the doctrine of FAA preemption
for the first time in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). Southland involved the
California Franchise Investment Law (CFIL), which purported to void agreements to arbitrate
CFIL claims. Id. at 3. Reasoning that the CFIL was preempted by the FAA, the Court
nonetheless enforced the parties’ arbitration clause. It justified this decision in part by
characterizing the CFIL as restricting autonomy qua negative liberty because it “require[d] a
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added). But the CFIL did not force parties to litigate against
their will; willing parties remained free to settle their disputes through arbitration. The CFIL
merely withdrew state assistance in compelling arbitration when one party refused to
cooperate.
155. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (emphasis
added); accord Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 458 (2003); Volt Info. Scis.,
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 472 (1989) (describing
enforcement as honoring the parties’ “liberty to choose the terms under which they will
arbitrate”).
156. Ware, supra note 82, at 555 (emphasis added); accord Brunet, supra note 16, at 6
(arguing that enforcement “contributes to party autonomy by upholding the intent of the
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“expression [to] private parties’ desires to control, to the maximum extent
possible, the nature and character of their underlying relationship.”157 But it cannot
be overemphasized that enforcing a contract typically does not honor the intention
of both parties. To be sure, the parties may have been uncoerced at the time they
entered the contract (let us call this T1). But in the case of predispute arbitration
agreements, enforcement typically does not happen until a much later point in time
(let us call this T2). At T2, it is almost certainly the case that the contract no longer
expresses the wishes of one party—otherwise there would be no occasion for
enforcement to begin with.
There are of course limited exceptions, such as where the court’s active
cooperation or assistance is required in order to effectuate performance.158 Consider
a predispute agreement to alter the standard for granting summary judgment under
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Here it is possible to imagine a
situation—however unlikely—in which (i) both parties continue to desire their
chosen procedural alteration at T2 but (ii) the court nonetheless refuses to honor it for
reasons of public policy. Scholars who argue in favor of viewing the Federal Rules
as default rules typically take this situation as their paradigm case, which in turn
helps them argue for a broad right to customize litigation procedures.159 After all, if
both parties reaffirm their choice at T2, it becomes harder to justify disregarding that
choice from either an autonomy or a Pareto-efficiency standpoint.
Another apt example relates to so-called back-end enforcement of agreements to
alter the grounds for vacatur of arbitral awards. FAA section 10 provides for vacatur
only upon proof of procedural irregularities such as arbitrator bias or a refusal to hear
material evidence.160 In Hall Street Associates v. Mattel,161 the parties sought to

parties in their choice of arbitration procedure” (emphasis added)).
157. Born, supra note 67, at 20 (emphasis added).
158. Bob Bone refers to procedures contemplated by such agreements as “Type III”
procedures. See Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1339–40 (2012).
159. Thus, Henry Noyes argues that because the parties jointly “own” the dispute, “it is
hard to accept that there is some fundamental unfairness in the parties’ agreement to adopt and
apply mutually agreed-upon litigation procedures.” Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They
Will Come: Contracts To Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 620 (2007). Fair enough if both parties remain in agreement at T2. But
if not, the argument in favor of enforcement against a reluctant party is far from
straightforward on either efficiency or autonomy grounds. Likewise, Michael Moffitt’s
well-known argument in favor of viewing the Federal Rules as default rather than mandatory
nonenforcement rules is fueled almost entirely by examples in which both parties are assumed
to be in agreement at T2. See, e.g., Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for
Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 472–73 (2007) (arguing that
if each side agrees not to object on hearsay grounds to the other’s expert’s testimony, there is
little reason to refuse enforcement). Indeed, Moffitt excludes from consideration contexts such
as mandatory binding arbitration, which involve adhesive agreements and a significant
“temporal distance between the agreement and its implementation”—contexts that are most
likely to produce disagreement about enforcement at T2. Id. at 481 (“Broad, anticipatory
customization is not what I envision.”).
160. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4) (2012).
161. 552 U.S. 576 (2008).

1170

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:1143

contract around section 10 by providing that awards could also be vacated for errors
of law. Following issuance of the arbitrator’s award, both parties filed cross-motions
to vacate for legal error on the basis of their contract. In other words, both reaffirmed
their agreement at T2; they just disagreed about what specific error had been
committed. A motion to enforce the agreement was still necessary, however, because
the parties required the court’s cooperation to conduct a heightened review, which
some courts had refused.162 These examples highlight the fact that even willing
parties are sometimes unable to execute their agreement without active assistance
from the courts.163 In such cases, the assumption of bilateral consent at T2—however
implausible as a factual matter—would appear warranted.
But the same is not true with respect to the front-end enforcement of arbitration
clauses under FAA section 2 or 4, which has been the central issue in almost all of
the Court’s game-changing arbitration decisions over the past five decades.164 Where
both parties remain in agreement after a dispute arises, there is no need for court
intervention because the parties will submit to their chosen arbitration process of
their own accord. In any legal action brought under section 2 or 4, therefore, at least
one party resists enforcement in part or in whole. This has two important implications
for the claim that enforcement promotes the parties’ autonomy qua negative liberty.
First, enforcement reduces the breaching party’s negative liberty because it is
plainly coercive.165 The point is even more forceful in the arbitration context because
the principal means of enforcing arbitration agreements is not through a liability rule
(i.e., money damages) but rather through a much more coercive set of property
rules166: (i) specific performance, which requires the breaching party to submit to
arbitration on pain of having a default judgment entered against her,167 and (ii) an
injunction barring access to the courts.168 Negative liberty theorists typically fail to

162. It was only on appeal that Mattel “switched horses” and argued that the FAA vacatur
standards were mandatory. See id. at 580.
163. This is especially true of procedural contracts, where the requested remedy is typically
specific performance. Courts have the discretion to deny specific performance if it would
“impose on the court burdens in . . . supervision that are disproportionate to the advantages to
be gained from enforcement.” 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 366 (1981).
164. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013)
(nonarbitrability and vindication of rights); AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740 (2011) (preemption); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010)
(separability and delegation); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)
(delegation); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
(nonarbitrability); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (preemption); Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (separability); Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427 (1953) (nonarbitrability). The only exceptions appear to be Hall Street, 552 U.S. 576,
and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
165. See SMITH, supra note 66, at 258 (“By their very nature, contractual obligations
restrict individual autonomy. Indeed, they represent one of the few ways by which a private
individual may legally restrict the future freedom of another.” (emphasis added)).
166. On the distinction between property and liability rules, see Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
167. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
168. See id. § 3.
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address the coerciveness of enforcement because they treat executory contracts as
simultaneous transactions—that is, they elide the crucial distinction between T1 and
T2.169 This leads them to assume that if there is no coercion at the time the adherent
enters the contract (T1), there is ipso facto no coercion at T2, because T1 = T2. By
contrast, critics of mandatory binding arbitration are apt to highlight this distinction,
as when they argue against the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements where lack
of understanding, optimistic overconfidence, or weak bargaining power at T1
typically lead the adherent to take a different view of her agreement at T2. The thrust
of their critique is not so much that consumers and employees are “coerced” or
“forced” at T1 when they are presented with an arbitration clause on a
“take-it-or-leave-it” basis; instead, it is that even if there were something short of
coercion at T1, there was certainly coercion at T2.170
Second, it is difficult to see how enforcement safeguards the nonbreaching party’s
negative liberty. Negative liberty might be improved when we protect someone from
harm or misfeasance—for example, from tortious interference with her person or
property. But as we saw, it is not improved when we protect her from nonfeasance
or, in what is the same thing, when we assist her in ways that we believe are wise,
good, or beneficial.171 Enforcing a wholly executory contract is more akin to the latter
than it is to the former. The reason is that, absent unjust enrichment or detrimental
reliance, breach is just the failure to fulfill the promise of a future benefit, which is
to say that it is more in the nature of an omission than active misfeasance.172 And if

169. This elision is also what causes some commentators erroneously to rest the case for
contract enforcement on Pareto efficiency. A simultaneous voluntary transaction is a reliable
indication of a move to Pareto-superior states of welfare in a way that a deferred transaction
that requires enforcement is not. The reason is that the Pareto standard cannot explain why the
breaching party’s revealed preference at T2 does not trump her revealed preference at T1, and
thus why a contract should be enforced over the present objection of one party. See infra note
256. It matters little that the breaching party may have changed her mind at T2
opportunistically or that she may never have intended to perform the contract to begin with.
The Pareto standard is a measure of utility not morality. See, e.g., VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 13 (Ann S. Schwier & Alfred N. Page eds., Ann S. Schwier trans.,
Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1971) (1906) (arguing that it is an “error” to critique the study
of political economy for “not taking morality into account. It is like accusing a theory of the
game of chess of not taking culinary art into account.”).
170. This is the argument behind longstanding efforts to amend the FAA to make
pre-dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable, inter alia, in the consumer and employment
contexts. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. (2015);
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013); Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2011, S. 987, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931,
H.R 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, H.R. 3010, 110th
Cong. (2007).
171. On the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance, see Peter Benson, Contract,
in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 29, 32 (Dennis Patterson ed.,
1996).
172. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 141–43 (1991); EMILE
DURKHEIM, ON THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 217 (George Simpson ed., trans.,
Macmillan Co. 1933) (1893) (arguing that by breaching a contract, “I do not enrich myself at
the expense of another; I only refuse to be useful to him”); cf. SMITH, supra note 66, at 140
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so, enforcement merely helps the nonbreaching party realize a benefit or satisfy her
expectations; it does not deter or compensate for any actual interference with her
freedom.173
The same is not necessarily true, of course, where the nonbreaching party has
partially performed and thereby either unjustly enriched the other party174 or relied
to her detriment.175 Enforcement in these circumstances does not simply further an
interest in keeping promises; it improves the nonbreaching party’s freedom from
unjust detention of her property176 and tortious conduct,177 respectively. But neither
situation captures what is typically at stake in the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.
One reason is that, according to the Court’s own “separability” doctrine,
arbitration clauses are conceived as stand-alone contracts whose validity or
enforceability does not depend on the validity or enforceability of the larger contract
in which they are contained.178 At the moment of breach, the arbitration clause (as
distinct from the container contract) is typically wholly executory; as to that clause,
reliance and restitution do not provide persuasive grounds to justify enforcement.179

(“An act of nonfeasance, such as failing to give to charity, may reveal the actor as lacking in
virtue . . . but it raises no question of rights, and hence is not a proper subject for legal
regulation [on individual-autonomy grounds].”).
173. This is the sense in which Lon Fuller and William Perdue argued that enforcing a
contract in these circumstances using the remedy of expectation damages amounts to a “queer
kind of ‘compensation.’” L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53 (1936).
174. An example would be a contract between A and B for the sale of goods, payment on
credit. If A delivers the goods at the time the contract is formed (T1) but B refuses to pay for
them at T2, A has a compelling claim of misfeasance: A has suffered a tangible loss (parting
with the goods) and B has gained a corresponding benefit that does not rightfully belong to
her.
175. An example would be a service contract between A and B. If B repudiates after A has
performed some part of the promised services, here, too, A will have a strong claim of
misfeasance because she has suffered actual, present harm.
176. Lon Fuller argued that in cases like this, it is not the expectation interest but rather the
restitution interest that “presents the strongest case for relief.” Fuller & Perdue, supra note
173, at 56. Consider that the gravamen of the medieval writ of debt, an important precursor of
the cause of action for breach of contract, was not that the defendant “had failed to do
something which he had said he was going to do, but rather that he was detaining or
withholding something to which the creditor was entitled. He was guilty of misfeasance, not
nonfeasance.” A. W. B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE
OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 80 (1975); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the
Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s“Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. REV.
94, 141 (2000) (“Debt, according to Holmes, had its origin not in . . . exchange of promises,
but in an action to recover a sum certain that the medieval jurists thought of as property of the
plaintiff wrongly withheld by the defendant.”).
177. See GILMORE, supra note 66, at 95–97.
178. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402–04 (1967).
179. By contrast, if one party withdrew from arbitration after proceedings had been
initiated but before the award, there would be a stronger tort-based argument to enforce the
agreement because the nonbreaching party would have detrimentally relied.
Here it could be retorted that, separability doctrine notwithstanding, performance of the
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Another reason is that the remedy enshrined in section 2 of the FAA for breaching
arbitration agreements is not restitution, reliance, or even expectation damages; it is
nothing less than mandatory specific performance. But specific performance is the
remedy par excellence for vindicating the promissory interest—that is, the interest in
realizing future benefits.180 It therefore goes far beyond compensating for any
interference with negative liberty, which has been the standard critique of awarding
expectation damages or specific performance in lieu of reliance or restitution.181
Given this, it is difficult to see how autonomy qua negative liberty can possibly
supply a reason in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements. As many theorists have
already observed, it is just as consistent with letting the parties alone, both in the
sense of (i) giving the breaching party the freedom to change her mind and (ii)
withholding assistance to the nonbreaching party in realizing the benefit of her
bargain or her expectation interests.182
Here it could be objected that enforcement is not coercive to the breaching party
because she had no right to breach in the first place. Any liberal society must

container contract is surely relevant insofar as it might suggest that the seller or service
provider conferred a benefit or relied to its detriment when the product or service was
originally provided and paid for. Because arbitration tends to lower costs, the argument goes,
rational sellers or service providers will pass those cost savings on to purchasers in the form
of lower prices. If the purchaser then breaks her promise to arbitrate, it would be unjust for her
to retain the benefit of the lower priced product or service, which also represents the measure
of the seller or service provider’s detrimental reliance. This is in the nature of a negative
liberty, rights-based retort.
But the argument that sellers and service providers pass on the cost savings from arbitration
to their customers has rarely been used to support enforcement on rights-based grounds;
instead, it has been used principally to support enforcement on efficiency grounds. The idea
is that everyone is better off (i.e., saves money) with arbitration clauses—including the
consumer who may choose otherwise. See Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive
Arbitration Agreements—with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration
Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 255–56 (2006); cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S.
585, 593–94 (1991) (making similar argument with respect to forum-selection clauses).
Likewise, the Court has rarely (if at all) invoked reliance or unjust enrichment to justify
enforcement, preferring instead to focus on the bare fact of an agreement or promise. For
example, it rationalized FAA preemption in part on the theory that the FAA “‘assure[s] those
who desired arbitration . . . that their expectations would not be undermined.’” Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (emphasis added) (quoting Metro Indus. Painting
Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring)).
Likewise, in undoing the nonarbitrability line of cases beginning with Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427 (1953), it frequently warned that, “‘having made the bargain to arbitrate,’ [parties would]
be held to their bargain.” Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987);
accord Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
180. As Seana Shiffrin argued in a related vein, if the purpose of contract law were to
enforce promises, specific performance rather than expectation damages would be the standard
remedy for breach. For morality requires that promisors keep their promises rather than pay
them off. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 708, 722–23 (2007).
181. See, e.g., supra note 173.
182. Pettit, supra note 62, at 286–90; Todd D. Rakoff, Is “Freedom From Contract”
Necessarily a Libertarian Freedom?, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 477, 481–82.
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recognize rule-of-law constraints on freedom. When a trespasser pitches a tent on
property owned by another, we think of the owner’s negative liberty as having been
infringed. Forcing the trespasser to leave or pay rent merely deters or compensates
for that infringement and is not in any meaningful sense an infringement of the
trespasser’s freedom. And if so, the objection goes, why shouldn’t it be the same in
the case of enforcing an arbitration agreement against a breaching party? I have two
responses.
First, the objection loses some force in the arbitration context. The reason is that
courts have invoked the autonomy thesis to support enforcement even where one
party had the right to breach and was therefore arguably without blame for resisting
arbitration. For instance, under the aegis of FAA preemption, countless parties have
been compelled to arbitrate pursuant to agreements that were either void or
unenforceable under state law.183 An important policy rationale for these
developments has nevertheless been the idea that enforcement furthers “consent, not
coercion,”184 the “wishes of the contracting parties,”185 and their “discretion in
designing arbitration processes . . . tailored to the type of dispute.”186 But for the
reasons explained above, it is difficult to see how this is the case where one party no
longer consents to or desires arbitration and was fully within her rights under state
law to go back on her agreement.
Second, even if the party resisting arbitration had no right to breach, it does not
somehow neutralize the unfreedom she experiences when the agreement is enforced
against her. This “neutralization” argument is a favorite of some libertarians, like
Robert Nozick, who view the law as merely rendering us unable to do things (for
example, commit trespass or breach of contract) rather than unfree to do them.187 But
as G. A. Cohen has argued, this is questionable as a factual matter since we consider
even properly convicted murderers to be unfree when they are imprisoned.188 The
real point seems to be that enforcement renders the breaching party unfree but that
her unfreedom is deemed normatively irrelevant because she has broken the law. But
the trouble is that normative judgments are not value neutral; in this case, the
judgment presupposes a baseline of legal entitlements that are themselves predicated

183. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (enforcing
arbitration agreement even though void because unconscionable or contrary to public policy);
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. 1 (enforcing arbitration agreement even though void by statute).
Justice Thomas would extend this to arbitration agreements that are unenforceable due to
post-formation defects such as frustration of purpose or the statute of frauds because he
assumes (paradoxically) that enforcement despite the defects would further the “consent of the
parties.” Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1755 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring).
184. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
479 (1989).
185. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995) (enforcing
award of punitive damages prohibited by state decisional law).
186. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749.
187. NOZICK, supra note 40, at 262 (“Other people’s actions place limits on one’s available
opportunities. Whether this makes one’s resulting action non-voluntary [i.e., free] depends
upon whether these others had the right to act as they did.”); see also HAYEK, supra note 32,
at 153 (“[W]hen we obey laws, in the sense of general abstract rules laid down irrespective of
their application to us, we are not subject to another man’s will and are therefore free.”).
188. COHEN, supra note 143, at 60.
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on assumptions about the significance or worth of certain activities such as failing to
keep promises or occupying land belonging to another.189 Enforcement reflects and
reinforces those normative judgments. It cannot therefore retreat into value neutrality
by claiming to honor the freedom of both parties. For in reality, it sacrifices the
freedom of one in order to vindicate the other’s. As Morris Cohen observed almost
a century ago,
in enforcing contracts, the government does not merely allow two
individuals to do what they have found pleasant in their eyes.
Enforcement, in fact, puts the machinery of the law in the service of one
party against the other. When that is worthwhile and how that should be
done are important questions of public policy. . . . [T]he notion that in
enforcing contracts the state is only giving effect to the will of the parties
rests upon an utterly untenable theory as to what the enforcement of
contracts involves.190
The upshot is that the breaching party’s freedom claims can be bracketed only by
relinquishing negative liberty’s aspiration to value neutrality. Otherwise put, a true
value-neutral stance must recognize that the breaching party’s freedom claim is no
less relevant than that of the nonbreaching party. But if so, as I have been arguing, it
is difficult to explain why enforcing a contract against the breaching party is
nonetheless consistent with promoting her negative liberty.
B. Positive Liberty and the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements
Does interpreting the autonomy thesis as a claim about positive liberty help
explain why arbitration agreements should be both minimally regulated and enforced
over the objection of the breaching party? Perhaps better than a negative liberty
interpretation, but not by much.191
In Part II.B.1, I argue that state regulation making arbitration agreements
unenforceable can cut both in favor of and against positive liberty. On the one hand,
if enforcing an arbitration agreement enables parties to accomplish things they could

189. Id. at 56, 59–60; Hale, supra note 143, at 470–74.
190. Cohen, supra note 46, at 562 (emphasis added). Writing less than a decade after the
FAA’s passage, Philip Phillips similarly noted the irony of a system of “voluntary” arbitration
that depended on judicial enforcement. See Philip G. Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law:
Compulsion as Applied to a Voluntary Proceeding, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1258, 1265–67 (1933).
191. Many scholars have likewise viewed contract enforcement as more consistent with
positive rather than negative liberty. See DURKHEIM, supra note 172, at 216 (referring to the
“eminently positive nature” of contract enforcement); Pettit, supra note 62, at 285–86 (arguing
that contract enforcement is more readily explainable on positive rather than negative liberty
grounds); Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 937 (1982)
(reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981)) (noting that “[i]t follows from
the harm principle that enforcing voluntary obligations is not itself a proper goal for contract
law,” yet defending enforcement on positive liberty grounds); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in
Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1992) (explaining private property and contract rights in positive
liberty terms).
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not without the assistance or cooperation of the courts, enforcement would appear to
promote the exercise of freedom and withholding enforcement would appear to
compromise it. On the other hand, if what the parties seek to accomplish through
their agreements is unlikely to result in any real or actual freedom, little will be lost
by refusing to enforce those agreements. For example, to what extent does it improve
positive freedom in arbitration to enforce agreements that call for the arbitrators to
decide a case by consulting the “entrails of a dead fowl”? The answer to this question
will likely depend on what we think freedom means in the arbitration context, which
in turn will presuppose certain value judgments.
In Part II.B.2, I argue that positive liberty provides a more plausible argument for
why enforcing an arbitration agreement against an unwilling party arguably promotes
her autonomy. The problem is that the conditions under which enforcement can be
understood as improving positive liberty often do not obtain in the case of arbitration
agreements. Yet arbitration law insists on enforcement regardless of whether those
conditions exist. The same point has been made about the law’s enforcement of
boilerplate clauses more generally.192 The upshot is that, to the extent we embrace a
positive liberty interpretation of the autonomy thesis, we may be forced to
acknowledge a variety of contexts in which arbitration agreements should not be
enforced at all.
1. Regulating Enforcement Does Not Necessarily Compromise Positive Liberty
The crux of the problem in Part II.A.1 was that, even assuming that both parties
remain in agreement at T2 (as the parties in Hall Street did in the trial court), it is
difficult to see how regulating arbitration agreements interferes with the parties’
negative liberty. For by refusing to enforce a particular arbitration agreement, the
state is not preventing or prohibiting parties from arbitrating on their own accord, as
they did within medieval guilds and still do within certain trade associations and
religious communities.193 Instead, it simply imposes conditions on the power to
invoke the machinery of enforcement when one party no longer wishes to be bound.
Construing the autonomy thesis as a claim about positive liberty presents a way out
of some of these problems. Assuming the unlikely scenario in which both parties
remain in agreement at T2—an assumption I shall indulge throughout Part II.B.1—state
assistance through enforcement can certainly promote the exercise of freedom. In Hall
Street, for example, enforcement enabled the parties to commandeer the resources of
a reviewing court through private agreement.194 In other cases, it helps the parties

192. See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 88, at 82–98.
193. Arbitration without recourse to courts of law has historically been possible where
there exists an effective means of enforcing agreements and awards extra-judicially—for
example, on the strength of professional or community norms. See, e.g., CLARENCE F.
BIRDSEYE, ARBITRATION AND BUSINESS ETHICS: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY
OF THE VARIOUS TYPES OF ARBITRATION AND THEIR RELATIONS TO BUSINESS ETHICS, at vii
(1926) (referring to “self-governing bodies . . . such as guilds, exchanges, boards of trade or
trade associations,” which created their own arbitration rules and enforced arbitration awards
internally); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 969–73 (1999).
194. See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text.
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realize the fruits of their agreement by providing for judicial assistance when they
cannot agree on the selection of arbitrators195 or when there is a need to stay related
litigation.196 Ironically, therefore, it is much easier to see how state regulation of
enforcement compromises autonomy if autonomy is understood as a form of positive,
rather than negative, liberty.
But once we shift gears and think of autonomy as the ability to do things rather
the mere absence of external constraints, the question of what things it makes sense
to say that we are (or should be) free to do becomes salient. We typically think of
being free to do only those things that have some plausible value. As Stanley Benn
and William Weinstein have argued, it seems something of an oxymoron to say
that one is free to do something completely valueless such as cutting off one’s
ears.197 “[T]o see the point of saying that one is (or is not) free to do X,” they
explain, “we must be able to see that there might be some point in doing it. Our
conception of freedom is bounded by our notions of what might be worthwhile
doing; it is out of its element when we find its objects bizarre.”198 Joseph Raz
reaches the same conclusion from the standpoint of his much thicker account of
positive liberty. In his view, it does not make sense to speak of autonomy in relation
to valueless activities such as murder.199 And in a related vein John Gray argues
that it is impossible to regard the proverbial “contented slave” as free no matter
how unconstrained she might have been when choosing slavery or how fulfilled
she now finds herself as a slave. For “judgments about freedom always invoke
judgments about the preferences of the standard rational chooser, and . . . there is
something at least problematic about counting as a freedom an opportunity to act
which no reasonable man would ever take.”200
If positive liberty cannot escape questions about purpose, value, or
reasonableness, then the extent to which enforcement furthers autonomy qua positive
liberty—and thus the extent to which restricting enforcement limits autonomy—will
depend critically on how those questions are answered. Consider the extreme case of
an arbitration agreement that provides for disputes to be adjudicated by a “panel of
three monkeys”201 or by “studying the entrails of a dead fowl.”202 Here it is difficult
to appreciate any good reason why parties would make such choices, let alone care

195. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012).
196. Id. § 3.
197. S. I. Benn & W. L. Weinstein explain this as follows: “[C]utting off one’s ears is not
the sort of thing anyone, in a standard range of conditions, would reasonably do . . . (even
though some people have, in fact, done it).” S. I. Benn & W. L. Weinstein, Being Free to Act,
and Being a Free Man, 80 MIND 194, 195 (1971).
198. Id.
199. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 380–81 (1986). Thus, although we might
consider one who writes a stern letter to the editor after careful reflection to be more
autonomous than one who does so in an unthinking rage, the same would not be true if the act
in question had been the commission of a brutal murder. Calculating and instrumentally
rational to be sure, but not autonomous.
200. GRAY, supra note 50, at 58.
201. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.).
202. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski,
J., concurring), overruled by Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
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about their enforcement. The point is not just that in such cases the freedom to choose
one’s arbitration process is outweighed by a more compelling concern for
arbitration’s public or institutional integrity.203 Rather, the point is that from a
positive liberty standpoint it is hard to appreciate how this is a freedom at all.204
Arbitrating before a panel of three monkeys, for instance, forecloses a host of moves
that we care about in adjudicative processes, such as the ability to present evidence
and reasoned arguments with confidence that a neutral decision maker will hear and
consider them. Much like cutting off one’s ears, it is difficult to see how such a
process contributes to anyone’s actual freedom and thus why the autonomy thesis,
construed as a claim about positive liberty, would favor enforcement.
Here it may be retorted that, as between a jurisdiction that does not enforce bizarre
arbitration procedures and one that does, there are more opportunities available (and
thus more freedom) in the latter.205 The problem with this retort is that the sheer
number of choices, while important, cannot be the exclusive measure of positive
freedom. Consider two further jurisdictions: in the first, courts will enforce any
choice of a decision maker so long as they are human; agreements calling for a panel
of three monkeys or a jury of twelve orangutans206 are unenforceable. In the second,
courts will enforce the choice of any primate to be a decision maker except those
who self-identify as Mormon. In terms of quantity, there are vastly more choices
available in the second jurisdiction—namely, the entire primate kingdom minus just
15 million humans.207 But that does not necessarily translate into more positive
freedom. There is arguably less real freedom in the second jurisdiction if it means
that parties will be deterred from appointing competent, desirable arbitrators of their

203. This is the typical rationale offered by commentators for why such agreements are, or
should be, unenforceable. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA To Permit
Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214, 233 n.76 (2007) (arguing
that “freedom of contract must yield in those cases where the integrity of the courts as an
institution is threatened”); cf. Richard Lorren Jolly, Between the Ceiling and the Floor:
Making the Case for Required Disclosure of High-Low Agreements to Juries, 48 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 813, 817–21 (2015) (arguing that the parties’ autonomy to select unconventional
litigation procedures should be limited by public policy considerations).
204. Taylor has defended this point in a related example. See supra note 60 and
accompanying text.
205. This might be a plausible argument if the state prohibited parties from arbitrating in
front of a panel of three monkeys, such as by imposing criminal penalties on such proceedings.
But as explained in Part II.A.1, when the state merely withholds the power of enforcement, it
does not in any meaningful sense place restrictions on negative liberty. The parties remain free
to arbitrate their disputes in any way they wish, so long as they do not require the court’s
assistance through enforcement.
206. United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[I]f the parties stipulated
to trial by 12 orangutans the defendant’s conviction would be invalid notwithstanding his
consent, because some minimum of civilized procedure is required by community feeling
regardless of what the defendant wants or is willing to accept.”).
207. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints estimates its current worldwide
membership at 15,372,337 individuals. See Facts and Statistics, THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS: NEWSROOM, http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/facts-and-statistics
[https://perma.cc/8SW2-CF36] (last updated 2016).
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own choosing who happen to subscribe to a particular faith.208 The upshot is that the
nature of our choices is at least as important as their quantity in our assessments
about freedom in the positive sense. Positive liberty claims register only against “a
background understanding, too obvious to spell out, of some activities and goals as
highly significant for human beings and others as less so.”209
A harder case has to do with agreements to modify the limited grounds for vacatur
of arbitral awards in FAA section 10. Prior to Hall Street, the circuit courts had split
sharply on this issue. Some courts enforced such agreements on freedom-based
considerations210 while others refused to do so, reasoning that customization would
confer on private parties a rather extravagant power to dictate how federal courts
should review arbitral awards—a power that, among other things, could significantly
change the workload of courts and threaten other institutional values.211 Although
the Court endorsed the latter view on narrow statutory-interpretation grounds,212 the
ensuing debate among commentators refocused the issues on the relationship
between the autonomy thesis and enforcement.
Most scholars argued that by refusing to enforce the agreement in Hall Street, the
Court was ipso facto retreating from the autonomy thesis.213 Ware, for instance,
declared Hall Street “an affront to party autonomy, the core policy of arbitration law.
Who is in a position to tell the parties that they are better off with litigation than with
arbitration followed by judicial review? Let them decide that for themselves.”214
These arguments assume that the state reduces freedom when it fails to promote a

208. Critics of so-called mandatory binding arbitration can be understood as making a
similar argument. The thrust of their objection is that consumers and employees are not in any
meaningful sense “free” in an arbitration proceeding because of the many process deficiencies
of arbitration. The implication is that they are actually freer in a judicial proceeding governed
by mandatory rules—that is, a proceeding in which fewer process choices are available. Here,
too, the sheer number of opportunities is not the measure of freedom; instead, assessments
about freedom turn on judgments about the comparative worth or value of arbitration as
against litigation.
209. TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 218.
210. See Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995),
abrogated by Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
211. See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs. Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th
Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 540 U.S. 1098 (2004); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co.,
254 F.3d 925, 934–37 (10th Cir. 2001); see also UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp.,
148 F.3d 992, 997–98 (8th Cir. 1998) (dictum); LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130
F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring), overruled by Kyocera, 341 F.3d 987.
212. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 585–89 (2008). Whether or not the opinion was correct or
desirable is a matter on which I take no position here. My claim is simply that the decision is
not obviously inconsistent with the autonomy thesis if “autonomy” is construed as a type of
positive liberty.
213. See Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 1103, 1128–33 (2009); Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and
Prospects for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929, 932 (2010)
(describing the view of most commentators that Hall Street “seemed to contravene the
principles of party autonomy and contractual freedom”).
214. Stephen J. Ware, “Opt-In” for Judicial Review of Errors of Law Under the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 263, 271–72 (1997).
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particular opportunity (such as judicial review of arbitral agreements) regardless of
the opportunity’s value or worth.
The trouble is that positive liberty does not work like negative liberty. If freedom
is conceived as the sheer absence of external restraints, then it is readily apparent
how fewer restrictions on choice implies greater negative liberty almost by
definition.215 But the argument is far less straightforward if the issue has less to do
with what choices the state prohibits and more to do with what choices the state fails
to promote. In this context, it is much harder to retreat into value neutrality by simply
counting the number of foreclosed opportunities. Doing so makes it impossible to
distinguish, for example, between a regime in which only agreements for vacatur
based on legal error are unenforceable and one in which only agreements to submit
disputes to a panel of three monkeys are unenforceable. If there are no distinctions
of value to be made, regimes that each fail to support one type of agreement leave us
equally unfree in the positive sense. Yet most commentators who consider Hall
Street to be inconsistent with the autonomy thesis would likely perceive the second
regime to provide far more real freedom than the first.216
From a positive liberty standpoint, therefore, Hall Street’s refusal to honor the
parties’ agreement for judicial review of an arbitrator’s legal errors would not
necessarily be in tension with the autonomy thesis if such agreements were valueless
in the sense that they were not “possible object[s] of reasonable choice.”217 For if so,
they are unlikely to contribute to real freedom in the arbitration process. This is not
an entirely unfamiliar argument. Thomas Carbonneau defends something like this
view when he argues that parties who contract for judicial review of arbitral awards
are “mistaken in their choice of arbitration.”218 On Carbonneau’s view, such contracts
“thwart the arbitral process by cluttering it with uselessly intricate provisions for

215. See supra note 205.
216. Ware might respond that he is not denying the possibility of making distinctions of
value in the abstract; rather, his claim is that it is not the place of the state to force those value
judgments on the parties. This appears to be the thrust of Alan Rau’s assessment of Hall Street
as “extraordinarily officious” because it “impos[ed] the putative ‘benefits’ of finality and
economy on parties” against their will. Rau, supra note 78, at 490. It is also implied in Justice
Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Hall Street. Stevens argued that the parties’ agreement should
be enforced because doing so represents a hands-off approach—what he referred to as “[a]
decision ‘not to regulate.’” Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original). The implication is that by refusing to give effect to the parties’ voluntary choices,
the state is actively interfering with their “freedom.”
But as we saw in Part II.A.1, when the state makes arbitration agreements unenforceable
(unlike when it makes arbitration illegal), it does not “force” or “impose” anything on the
parties; it just withholds the benefit of the state’s enforcement machinery, thereby “leav[ing]
both parties as it finds them.” See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900,
1907 (2011). The decision to withhold those benefits is based on public values and policies to
be sure, but that is not the same as saying that the values are being “imposed” on private
parties.
217. Benn & Weinstein, supra note 197, at 195.
218. Carbonneau, Crossroads, supra note 1, at 258 (emphasis added); see also Thomas E.
Carbonneau, The Rise in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates,
14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 593, 613 (2012) (suggesting that this type of choice is
“ill-considered” and not “responsibl[e]”).
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arbitration”219 and by subjecting it to increased oversight and scrutiny by courts of
law.220 Enforcing them may enable certain choices, but over time it is also likely to
frustrate many others that users of arbitration care deeply about: speed, economy,
and avoiding “full-bore” judicial proceedings, to name a few.221 At the end of the
day, the argument goes, we will find ourselves stuck in a less functional and effective
process—and in this sense less free. Thus, rather than see Hall Street as in tension
with the autonomy thesis, Carbonneau reconciles the two by drawing the following
lesson: “parties can choose freely as long as their choices do not lead to an
oxymoronic or pathological reference to arbitration.”222 The upshot is not so much
that party autonomy should be subordinated to extra-contractual values such as the
institutional integrity of the courts,223 but that certain choices are themselves so
“pathological” or “oxymoronic” that they do not contribute in any meaningful sense
to the actual exercise of freedom. And if so, the autonomy thesis, understood as a
claim about positive liberty, would not seem to require encouraging those choices by
enforcing them.
Stipanowich makes a similar argument. He believes that agreements such as the
one at issue in Hall Street sometimes reflect “wrong” or “questionable” choices,
either because they end up compromising important process values such as finality
or because they suggest a lack of serious, second-order reflection that characterizes
autonomy in the thick positive sense.224 He argues that the fundamental question
raised by these provisions is whether they are of any real benefit to end users. He
reports that leading arbitration attorneys and arbitrators recently answered this
question “with a resounding ‘No!’”225 The explanation, again, returns us to questions
of value: the respondents “viewed such provisions as undermining key conventional
benefits of arbitration, including finality, efficiency, economy, and expert decision
making.”226
For those like Stipanowich and Carbonneau who interpret autonomy in positive
more so than negative terms, autonomy might not necessarily require the
enforcement of arbitration agreements strictly “according to their terms.”227 For some
agreements, if enforced to the letter, will not in any meaningful sense improve our
actual freedom in arbitration; indeed, they may make us less free. This seems
straightforwardly true for marginal cases such as agreements to arbitrate before a
panel of three monkeys or by consulting the entrails of a dead fowl. I take no position
on whether this is also true in the case of agreements like the one in Hall Street other
than to note that reasonable minds such as Ware, Stipanowich, and Carbonneau have
actually differed on the issue.

219. Carbonneau, Contract Freedom, supra note 1, at 1231.
220. Carbonneau, supra note 218, at 614.
221. See Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 588.
222. Carbonneau, supra note 218, at 613.
223. But see id. at 594 (describing the “restraints placed upon contract freedom” by
Hall Street).
224. Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 425–26 (citing the CPR Commission on the Future
of Arbitration); id. at 436.
225. Id. at 426.
226. Id.
227. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013).
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In sum, as between positive and negative liberty interpretations of the autonomy
thesis, the former presents a much more plausible argument against regulating the
enforceability of arbitration agreements. But as we saw in this section, positive
liberty can sometimes be consistent with such regulation because it cannot be
divorced from questions of value. We will disagree about these values to be sure; the
important point is just that our assessments about what type of regulation is (or is
not) consistent with the autonomy thesis cannot pretend to be value neutral.228
2. Enforcement Can Promote the Positive Liberty of the Party Who No Longer
Wishes To Arbitrate
Of course, even in a case like Hall Street one party almost certainly resists
enforcement. How, then, does positive liberty help overcome the problem in Part
II.A.2—the problem of how forcing a party to arbitrate against her wishes can
nonetheless be said to further her positive liberty?
One answer is to concede that enforcement diminishes the freedom of the
breaching party but to argue that this diminution is outweighed by the greater
freedom made available to others by strengthening the institution of enforcement. I
shall defer a consideration of this argument to Part III.
Another answer is to entertain a much thicker conception of positive liberty, not so
much as the ability to exercise free choice but as a capacity for self-legislation—what
many philosophers would say is the only true autonomy. Autonomy in this sense is
not coterminous with the idea of freedom and can sometimes imply just the
opposite.229 Dworkin makes this point with an example from Homer’s Odyssey:
Not wanting to be lured onto the rocks by the sirens, [Odysseus]
commands his men to tie him to the mast and refuse all later orders he
will give to be set free. He wants to have his freedom limited so that he
can survive. . . . He has a preference about his [future] preferences, a
desire not to have or to act upon various desires. He views the desire to
move his ship closer to the sirens as something that is no part of him, but
alien to him. In limiting his liberty, in accordance with his wishes, we
promote, not hinder, his efforts to define the contours of his life.230
Consider that if Odysseus had not been tied down, he would have been free at T2 to
steer (or not to steer) toward the island of the Sirens. But if he had actually done so
under the influence of the Sirens’ song, we would not think of him as having acted
autonomously. Odysseus’s autonomy consists instead in the fact that he recognizes
that his own first-order choice at T2 is liable to be misguided, regrettable, or
otherwise compromised.231 Rather than sit by passively, he has made a second-order

228. See TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 218.
229. See, e.g., id. at 222 (“[T]he fact that I am doing what I want, in the sense of following
my strongest desire, is not sufficient to establish that I am [autonomous].”).
230. DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 14–15 (emphasis added).
231. The trouble with a negative liberty or even a thin positive liberty justification for
enforcement is that each fails to distinguish between first- and second-order choices. They are
therefore disabled from making distinctions about the quality of the agent’s decision making
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choice at T1 to be self-directing—to take his fate into his own hands. The fact that
this involves restricting rather than expanding his freedom at T2 does not make him
less autonomous; if anything, it makes him more so.
In order for this argument to work, we must feel confident that the quality of the
agent’s second-order choice at T1 is somehow superior to her first-order choice at T2
in the sense that it was both more independent and rational.232 If Odysseus had
instructed his men to tie him to the mast at T1 out of an uncritical deference to a
trusted advisor, we might think he made the right decision but we would not think of
him as having acted independently.233 By the same token, if Odysseus had chosen to
reject the regimen of his military training in favor of a more spontaneous, “come
what may” attitude toward life and as a result instructed his men not to restrain him
despite the evident risks, we might think of him as enjoying a certain carefree
independence but we would not consider him to have acted rationally (particularly if
he ended up being lulled to his death). In this case, we would not consider Odysseus
more autonomous for sticking to his decision at T1 to be unrestrained; to the contrary,
we would consider him more autonomous if, just before coming within earshot of
the Sirens at T2, he realizes he has made a terrible mistake and commands his men to
strap him.
Now consider someone who enters into a binding predispute arbitration
agreement. We can understand this as a type of self-legislation at T1 if the agent acts
(i) independently, insofar as she makes up her own mind to opt out of the litigation
default rather than doing so out of laziness, peer pressure, or other internal weakness
of will, and (ii) rationally, insofar as she can articulate plausible reasons for doing
so, such as anticipated efficiency gains, the ability to select expert decision makers,
or quite simply that she is being offered a lower price in exchange for her promise to
arbitrate.234 Only then might holding the agent to this act of self-legislation promote

at T1 and T2. As a result, enforcement can be explained on freedom grounds only by assuming
away the existence of a contrary choice at T2 or by conceding its existence but treating it as
normatively irrelevant. By introducing the concept of a second-order choice, it is no longer
necessary to elide the coercive nature of contract enforcement. Indeed, the agent’s considered
choice to subject herself to that coercion at T2 is precisely what makes her decision at T1
autonomous. It reflects a recognition that she might be under a strong temptation to act out of
shortsighted motives and breach the contract at T2, but that in the long run she would be better
off upholding it.
232. O’Neill, supra note 53, at 203–05 (defending a conception of autonomy that combines
notions of coherence and independence of the will); see also BENN, supra note 52, at 176;
DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 18 (distinguishing between acting from one’s “reflective and
critical faculties” and acting under “subliminal” or other “ad hoc” influences); GRAY, supra
note 50, at 57–59 (“[N]o viable conception of liberty can altogether dispense with
considerations deriving from the difficult idea of the real or rational will.”).
233. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 16 (arguing that autonomy consists (in part) in
being able to “scrutinize critically [one’s] first-order motivations”); see also BENN, supra note
52, at 177 (arguing that the autonomous person does not make choices based on “beliefs he
has simply introjected uncritically and unexamined from his social milieu”).
234. Of course, this is a slippery slope. As Berlin warned, once we are in a position to
interrogate the plausibility of the agent’s reasons, we are in a position to tell the agent that
some of her reasons are mistaken or just plain wrong. To some positive liberty theorists,
however, making such judgments is intimately bound up with assessments of autonomy.
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her autonomy even when she develops a strong first-order preference at T2 to litigate.
Part of the reason why is that we believe her preference to avoid the agreement at T2
is likely to be short-sighted, less reflective, and in this way less autonomous than the
second-order choice she takes at T1 to pre-commit to forego that preference.235 But
if her choice to avoid the agreement at T2 were somehow more independent and
rational than her decision to enter it at T1, either because it was taken with better or
more complete information, or because the reasons against submitting the dispute to
arbitration are vastly more compelling than the reasons in favor of it, then it becomes
a serious question whether the autonomy thesis still requires enforcement.236
The trouble is that in the context of adhesion contracts, at least, it is difficult to
describe the decision that most consumers and employees take at T1 as an act of
self-legislation. The point is not the familiar one that such parties are not truly free
to choose (and thus do not meaningfully consent) when terms are presented to them
on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis.237 The futility of consent is principally a claim about

TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 226–28 (arguing that the agent cannot be the final arbiter of whether
he or she is free).
Gray suggests something of a middle path, which is to say that the agent should be able to
articulate “a reason” for her choice—a requirement intended to “disqualif[y] as rational
conduct . . . only the behaviour of a delirious agent, where no goal or end may be imputed to
[her] which renders intelligible what [s]he does.” GRAY, supra note 50, at 59. On this account,
we would not consider someone who chooses to arbitrate an important commercial dispute in
front of a panel of three monkeys to be acting autonomously, in part because we doubt that an
adjudicative process so devoid of value could be a possible object of reasonable choice. For
what reasons would such a person offer to explain her choice? What intelligible goals or
purposes would the choice further?
235. For example, if she turns out to be the defendant in a subsequent dispute, she may
prefer to litigate if she could more effectively drag out the proceedings through plenary
discovery and motion practice under the rules of judicial procedure. Likewise, if she turns out
to be the plaintiff, she may prefer to plead her case to a jury.
Early twentieth century supporters of the FAA made a similar point in their assault on the
common-law revocability doctrine. The problem with revocability, they argued, was that it
enabled the short-sighted interests of litigants and their lawyers, who sought to escape
predispute arbitration agreements for opportunistic reasons more so than because of an
improvident or otherwise compromised choice at T1. See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 23, at
1997–99.
236. To be sure, enforcement might nonetheless be justified on fairness or morality
grounds—for example, because the other party has relied to her detriment or conferred a
benefit, or simply because a promise is a promise. From an autonomy standpoint, however,
the reasons against enforcement would appear to outweigh those in favor of it.
237. This critique, of course, has a long pedigree. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943);
Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970); Edwin W. Patterson, The
Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919) (arguing that “‘freedom
of contract’ rarely exists” with respect to “contracts of ‘adhesion’”); Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983)
(noting that in many situations, the propounder of the preprinted form contract does not expect
that the adherent will read or understand it); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971); Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Comment, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1976).
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the ability to exercise free choice—that is, a claim about the lack of certain external
resources such as time, financial ability, or other incidents of bargaining leverage.238
Rather, the point is that such parties also typically lack internal prerequisites for
making a second-order choice about their future choices, such as a full and complete
understanding of the procedures to which they are committing themselves,239 an
ability to discuss potential disputes candidly,240 or a motivation to plan for them in
advance.241 In other words, they are often not “in a position to reflect upon [or] resist”
arbitration clauses—capacities that John Christman takes to be a hallmark of
autonomy in the thick positive sense.242
These internal constraints, moreover, do not appear to be unique to the adhesion
context. As Stipanowich reports, they are just as likely to afflict sophisticated parties
with greater bargaining leverage, many of whom fail to invest independent, critical
thought into selecting sensible dispute-resolution options and appear all too willing
to delegate those decisions to others.243 And if so, it is difficult to appreciate how
their autonomy is furthered by enforcing the choice they made at T1 over their revised
and more proximate choice at T2. For the latter is more likely to have been made with
greater information about the nature of the dispute, with greater attention paid to the
scope of the arbitration agreement, or with advice from a lawyer.
In short, interpreting the autonomy thesis as a claim about autonomy in the thick
positive sense has the greatest potential to explain the enforcement of arbitration
agreements against unwilling parties as a theoretical matter. But if, as a factual
matter, many arbitration agreements (adhesive or otherwise) do not actually manifest
the self-legislation characteristic of this type of autonomy, construing the autonomy
thesis in this way likely militates against enforcement in a variety of circumstances.
This, in turn, puts the autonomy thesis in tension with arbitration law—hardly
surprising since the latter’s strong negative liberty orientation prevents it from
distinguishing first-order from second-order choice.244 Consider again Doctor’s

238. Note this is a claim about the lack of positive rather than negative liberty. Critics of
“take-it-or-leave-it” contracts do not, in the main, contend that such contracts amount to
external coercion such as duress or even undue influence.
239. Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis & Yuxiang Liu, “Whimsy Little
Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer
Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 45–48 (2015) (finding, inter alia,
that only 14% of respondents shown an arbitration clause realized that it precluded them from
suing in court).
240. See Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 390 (explaining that sophisticated parties often
fail to make good predispute choices regarding arbitration, in part because they are “reluctant
to dwell on the subject of relational conflict”).
241. See Sovern et al., supra note 239, at 24 (surveying existing empirical studies and
concluding that the “[l]ength and density [of standard form contracts] deter consumers from
attempting to read contract terms at all, and the terms are unintelligible for most people who
attempt to read them”).
242. Christman, supra note 49, at 346.
243. See supra notes 100–14 and accompanying text. This may explain recent findings that
procedural contracting is not as common as we are apt to believe. See generally David A.
Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389; W. Mark C. Weidemaier,
Customized Procedure in Theory and Reality, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865 (2015).
244. The same might also be said of contract law, which takes objective rather than
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Associates v. Casarotto, which involved a Montana statute that made arbitration
clauses unenforceable unless “‘[n]otice that [the] contract is subject to arbitration’”
is “‘typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract.’”245 As many
argued, the statute was consistent with (and even tended to promote) autonomy in
the thick positive sense because it enforced only those arbitration agreements that
were at least brought to the attention of the nondrafting party.246 Nonetheless, the
Court held that it was preempted by the FAA.247
The upshot is that if we justify enforcement in certain contexts as promoting
self-legislation, we will have to part company with arbitration law in other contexts
where enforcement—let alone rigorous enforcement—is arguably inconsistent with
self-legislation. We will also need to recognize that proposed reforms such as the
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015 may not be so opposed to autonomy qua
self-legislation and might even help promote it. The crux of the Act is not that
arbitration is categorically inappropriate for consumers and employees; instead, it is
that it is very difficult for them to make a considered, reflective judgment about binding
arbitration—that is, to effectively self-legislate—before an actual dispute has arisen.
III. THE “MAXIMUM NET AUTONOMY” ARGUMENT
In this Part, I consider a final argument that is sometimes used to explain how
contract enforcement furthers autonomy even while it restricts the freedom of the
breaching party. It goes something like this: the greater freedom that is preserved for
others to enter agreements with the confidence that they will be enforced outweighs
any unfreedom that inures to breaching parties in particular cases. I refer to this as
the “maximum net autonomy” argument.
The argument is not without its supporters. Charles Fried, for instance, describes
contract enforcement as beneficial insofar as it produces a net increase in the freedom
of all to continue making contracts.248 Smith suggests that restricting the breaching
party’s freedom is justified because it “generally increases our options” and
“permit[s] us to do things we could not do otherwise”—that is, it produces greater
net freedom overall.249 The claim has also been made in the arbitration context. For
example, Ware has argued that “[t]he interests of consumers as a group are better

subjective consent as sufficient to bind the promisor even as to boilerplate terms. See RADIN,
supra note 88, at 89–90. The difference is that the rigorous enforcement of arbitration
agreements means that any state legislative efforts designed to improve the quality of assent
to such agreements are prohibited, whereas contract law readily cedes ground to such efforts
in specific adhesive contexts.
245. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (alteration in original)
(quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)).
246. E.g., Moses, supra note 71, at 542.
247. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687. The decision has been construed as preventing states from
requiring a minimum level of informed consent to arbitration agreements.
248. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 7–17 (1981).
249. SMITH, supra note 66, at 258; see also Pettit, supra note 62, at 281–83 (arguing that
both state regulation and enforcement of contracts, while decreasing the freedom of some,
may increase the “sum total of freedom of exchange in society”).
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served” by enforcing mandatory arbitration clauses because a system that facilitates
trading the right to judicial resolution for lower prices will create more options for
them generally.250
The maximum net autonomy argument in many ways presents the strongest
affirmative rationale for enforcing contracts in general, which is why it deserves
some treatment here. But there are two basic problems with it in the arbitration
context. First, the argument is directed first and foremost at promoting the institution
of predispute arbitration agreements. It therefore cannot explain why any particular
agreement, such as the one at issue in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion251 or in
American Express v. Italian Colors,252 should be enforced. More importantly, it
cannot explain why arbitration agreements are enforced more strictly than contracts
generally. For example, it cannot explain why arbitration agreements should be
enforced even when they are contrary to state legislation or public policy.253 The
reason is that the institution itself can thrive even while a whole host of individual
arbitration agreements are denied enforcement, just like the insurance industry
thrives even though insurance contracts are one of the most heavily regulated of their
kind. Indeed, refusing to enforce particular arbitration agreements, such as
agreements to arbitrate before a panel of three monkeys, might actually strengthen
the institution’s legitimacy.
Second, because it subordinates the autonomy of the contracting parties to
autonomy conceived in much broader terms, it is not strictly speaking a freedom or
autonomy argument at all. To understand how this is the case, it will be necessary to
unpack the distinction between liberty and autonomy theories, on the one hand, and
utilitarian or efficiency theories, on the other.
An example of an efficiency theory is the idea that, because the individual is the
best judge of her own welfare, voluntary transactions are almost certain to make at
least one person better off and no person worse off (assuming no externalities).254
Promoting such “Pareto superior” exchanges would therefore appear to promote
welfare writ large. Another example is cost-benefit theories, which hold that overall
welfare can be maximized even if some persons are made worse off so long as others
are made better off to a greater degree. For example, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
expresses the idea that a given state of affairs is welfare enhancing if and only if the
“winners gain sufficiently so that they could compensate the losers with a net gain in
welfare,” even if no compensation actually takes place.255
Enforcing a particular arbitration agreement against an unwilling party could be
justified as Kaldor-Hicks efficient so long as the costs to that party were outweighed
by its benefits to the other.256 The institution of enforcing arbitration agreements

250. Ware, Consumer Arbitration, supra note 95, at 210–12.
251. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
252. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
253. This follows as a consequence of FAA preemption. See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 4,
at 1271–72; Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189,
1229–30 (2011).
254. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 7 (1997)
(emphasizing that this is only a “presumption”).
255. JULES COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 136 (1998) (emphasis added).
256. By contrast, it is difficult to see how enforcing a contract against an unwilling party
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more generally could likewise be justified as long as the aggregate cost to parties
who are compelled to arbitrate are outweighed by the aggregate benefits to society
in the form of docket clearing, conservation of judicial resources, and savings in cost
and time.
The problem, however, is that efficiency arguments and autonomy arguments are
very different animals. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency arguments, for instance, entail no
special solicitude for private ordering because an arrangement can be Kaldor-Hicks
efficient regardless of whether anyone has actually consented to it.257 If it could
somehow be proved that using arbitration saves lending institutions and courts far
more money than the cost to consumers of forfeiting a judicial forum,258 there would
be a strong efficiency-based justification for categorically referring all consumer
debt-collection cases to arbitration regardless of the consumer’s wishes.259 By the
same token, parties have sometimes invoked cost-benefit considerations to argue
against enforcing arbitration agreements that they had freely entered.260 For example,

is a reliable way to promote Pareto superior moves. Even if the promisor freely consented at
T1, her “revealed” preference at T2 reflects an assessment that completing the transaction will
leave her worse off. The Pareto standard therefore cannot explain why her antecedent choice
is more relevant to the utilitarian calculus than her updated choice at the time of
enforcement—a problem Michael Trebilcock has dubbed the “Paretian dilemma.”
TREBILCOCK, supra note 254, at 244; see also Peter Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of
Justification for Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 273, 284 (1995) (arguing that Pareto
efficiency “cannot possibly provide a normative basis for contract”); Jay M. Feinman, Critical
Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 841 (1983) (arguing that contract law
favors the breaching party’s “prior exercise of autonomy in entering into the agreement over
the present exercise of autonomy in disavowing it,” which “by definition decreases [her]
welfare”); Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 742 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2004)
(“Pareto efficiency itself cannot explain why the ex ante Pareto result that argues for enforcing
the agreement should be privileged over the ex post Pareto result that argues against enforcing
the agreement.” (italics omitted)).
257. See COLEMAN, supra note 255, at 134; TREBILCOCK, supra note 254, at 245–48.
The same is not necessarily true of Pareto efficiency, which enjoys a certain synergy with
autonomy theories. See COLEMAN, supra note 255, at 101–05; IAN SHAPIRO, THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICS 43–44 (2003) (arguing that “Pareto’s denial of the possibility of
interpersonal comparisons had the effect of importing a powerful doctrine of individual
autonomy into the core logic of utilitarianism” that “create[d] analytical and moral space for
the Enlightenment ideal of individual rights”). For the reasons stated above, however, Pareto
efficiency does not provide even a plausible efficiency justification for enforcing a contract
over the present objection of one party. See supra note 256.
258. PETER B. RUTLEDGE, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ARBITRATION—A
GOOD DEAL FOR CONSUMERS 13 (2008) (estimating that if predispute arbitration clauses could
not be enforced in consumer debt-collection cases, a “deluge of new cases” would increase the
docket of California small-claims courts by roughly 14%).
259. Of course, it is precisely because we value individual liberty that state-mandated
arbitration schemes are rare, although not unknown. See Dwight Golann, Making Alternative
Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487, 565–66 (1989).
260. But the autonomy thesis has meant that such efficiency-based arguments are almost
always cast aside. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (enforcing arbitration clause despite defendant’s argument that doing
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in Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, the plaintiff argued that the benefits of enforcement
were outweighed by the delay and other inefficiencies that would likely result from
having to litigate federal-law claims while arbitrating pendent state-law claims.261
Cost-benefit arguments are sometimes made to look like autonomy arguments by
substituting “autonomy” for “welfare.” This is the gist of the maximum net autonomy
argument, which holds that any loss in the breaching party’s autonomy caused by
enforcement is outweighed by the greater gain in autonomy that the rest of us enjoy
by having a reliable institution of enforcement. But what passes for “autonomy” here
is in truth something like utility, to be maximized across individuals even if it means
sacrificing the autonomy of some for the greater autonomy of others. It is a slippery
slope from the proposition that restricting the breaching party’s freedom creates even
more freedom overall to the proposition that restricting freedom in other ways will
result in a like increase. This is why the maximum net autonomy argument is not a
bona fide autonomy argument. For it gives short shrift to ideas of voluntariness,
separateness, and choice that, in one form or other, are central to both negative and
positive conceptions of individual freedom.262
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have questioned the extent to which the autonomy thesis provides
a basis for insisting on the rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements—that is,
for insisting that such agreements are not just enforced but enforced with minimal
regulation by the state. If the thesis is construed as a claim about negative liberty, it
is difficult to see how autonomy requires either enforcement or minimal regulation.
If, following some scholars, it is construed as a claim about positive liberty, the
argument in favor of enforcement becomes more persuasive in theory (but less so in
practice), while the argument in favor of minimal regulation becomes bound up with
questions of value. It thus appears that we face something of a choice going forward:
either we continue to claim that autonomy is “the highest priority in the pantheon of
arbitration values”263 but recognize that autonomy cannot fully explain the law’s
rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements, or we insist that arbitration
agreements must be rigorously enforced but begin considering what alternative
values or policy rationales can be mustered in support of it.

so would create inefficiencies in the form of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or
fact); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983) (enforcing
arbitration clause despite plaintiff’s argument that compelling arbitration was inefficient
because it would require related disputes to be resolved in separate arbitral and judicial forums
rather than being consolidated before a court of law).
261. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985) (enforcing an
arbitration agreement regardless of whether doing so would be “possibly inefficient”).
262. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. Jules Coleman has made a similar
point in a different context. Cf. COLEMAN, supra note 255, at 138–39 (criticizing
consequentialist arguments that treat “deontological categories—rights, justice, fairness,
equality and so on—exclusively as objects of preference”).
263. Brunet, supra note 16, at 5.

